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SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AT THE BOUNDARIES OF EXPERIENCE
Nora Mills Boyd, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2018
My dissertation introduces a new empiricist philosophy of science built on a novel charac-
terization of empirical evidence and an analysis of empirical adequacy appropriate to it. I
analyze historical and contemporary cases primarily, though not exclusively, from the space
sciences attending carefully to the intricate practices involved in data collection and pro-
cessing. I argue that the epistemic utility of empirical results as constraints on theorizing
depends on the conditions of their provenance and that therefore information about those
conditions ought to be included in our conception of empirical evidence. I articulate the con-
ditions requisite for adjudicating the empirical adequacy of a theory with respect to some
evidence and argue that much more background information is required for this adjudication
than has been widely appreciated. Although my account is strictly anti-realist, this project
is a defense of a sense of epistemic progress in science. Empirical evidence, as I have de-
fined it, genuinely accumulates over the history of human inquiry. We learn that whatever
theoretical framework we propose for understanding what the world is like will have to be
consistent with this growing evidential corpus.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION: EPISTEMIC PROGRESS IN SCIENCE
Philosophers of science who engage with the problem of scientific progress have (at least since
Kuhn) looked to the history of science for their philosophical ore. This historically-oriented
philosophy of science has often focused on apparent discontinuities in the scientific record
marked by revolutions in scientific theory. Philosophy of scientific progress has been primarily
concerned with giving accounts of the familiar trajectory beginning with Ptolemy, passing
through Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton and ending with Einstein, with the trajectory
from alchemy through the chemical revolution, and so on...in short: understanding how
mature scientific fields emerged from a graveyard of diverse worldviews.
As a consequence, some philosophers have adopted non-epistemic accounts of scientific
progress (what Bird (2007) calls “functional-internalist” accounts). For instance, those who
understand the history of science as a series of paradigms and revolutions have a difficult time
reconciling their view with the plausibility of cumulative epistemic progress. Notoriously,
Kuhn (1975) resorted to a kind of pragmatic understanding of scientific progress as progress
in problem-solving capabilities rather than increased knowledge about the natural world.
According to Kuhn, scientists adopt a new paradigm when the growing pile of unsolved
anomalies besetting their old paradigm becomes unbearable; “[t]he scientific community is
a supremely efficient instrument for maximizing the number and precision of the problems
solved through paradigm change” (1975, 168).
Both Larry Laudan and Dudley Shapere furnished accounts of scientific change in the
wake of the reception of Kuhn’s work. Both philosophers were concerned to construct philo-
sophical accounts that did not fall prey to the difficulties that beset logical empiricism and
the sort of relativism that Kuhn’s philosophy inspired. Laudan (1977, 1996) concerned him-
self with the interplay between rationality and progress in science. He too understands
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scientific progress in terms of problem-solving effectiveness and he eschews the characteriza-
tion of progress as cumulative. On Laudan’s view, scientific progress is evaluated according
to our standards, which are not the necessarily the same standards of the historical figures
of science (1996, 138). Similarly, Shapere (1984) argued that science “involves no unalter-
able assumptions whatever, whether in the form of substantive beliefs, methods, rules, or
concepts” (238). In other words, for both philosophers, the ‘rules’ of scientific methodology
change with historical context.
Kukla (1990) presented a ten-element taxonomy, which modified and expanded Laudan’s
classification of scientific progress. His primary criticism of Laudan’s scheme was that it did
not allow for the fact that the creation of empirical problems can constitute advances in
science (Kukla, 1990, 459). Kukla describes six different types of scientific activities related
to theory development:
(1) inventions that increase the scope of a theory (which I will call constructions[)], (2)
discoveries that increase the scope of a theory (expansions), (3) discoveries that decrease
the scope of a theory (contractions), (4) inventions that increase the probability of a theory
(simplifications), (5) discoveries that increase the probability of a theory (amplifications),
and (6) discoveries that decrease the probability of a theory (degradations) (462).
All of these activities are “theoretical”, according to Kukla, in that “they can be conducted
without breaking the contact between armchair and backside” (463). He names four further
activities (empirical amplification, empirical degradation, empirical expansion, and empirical
contraction) that are “more athletic” (Kukla, 1990, 464). Interestingly, Kukla describes all
four of these “empirical” activities as “guided by theoretical concerns” (ibid.). However, he
does add one further category, which he does not include in the ten-element taxonomy of
progress:
There is also a relatively atheoretical type of research exemplified by the activities of natural
historians. This kind of research does not attempt to confirm or disconfirm a theoretical
point of view, nor does it seem to affect the explanatory scope of any theory. Natural
historians collect data which strike them as intuitively important or interesting...for the
sake of taxonomic elegance, I prefer to treat it as a limiting case of empirical expansion
(Kukla, 1990, 464).
This taxonomy is promising in the sense that it aims to give an exhaustive account of the
modes of scientific activity that contribute to progress. Furthermore, although Kukla down-
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plays the role of the natural historian-like activities involved in scientific reasarch, he is
right to identify them. In fact, we will find that such activities are especially important in
progressing frontier science. However, in weighting his description of scientific activity so
heavily in the direction of “theoretical concerns”, like Laudan, Kukla has failed to provide an
account of cumulative epistemic progress transcending the framework of particular theories
in which scientific inquiry has increased our knowledge about the natural world. Indeed,
Mizrahi and Buckwalter (2014) note that “few contemporary philosophers of science directly
associate scientific progress with knowledge” (152).1 In particular, several important ques-
tions remain unanswered. I contend that any account of epistemic progress in natural science
should provide answers to the following questions:
1. What is the nature of the scientific knowledge that we actually have?
2. How has such knowledge improved over time?
3. What sorts of improvements may reasonably be anticipated in the future?
On my view, scientific progress importantly involves constraining viable theoretical in-
terpretations by increasing empirical access. We gain greater empirical access to the natural
world by way of further observation, detection and experiment. This access yields an ac-
cumulating evidential corpus that in turn constrains the landscape of viable interpretive
approaches by which we attempt to understand what the available evidence means for how
the world is. Scientists do not just become better problem-solvers, they really do learn more
about the natural world. Certain alternatives are not consistent with the available evidential
corpus—and that counts as knowledge about the world.
The view of the epistemology of science that I defend in this dissertation addresses a
particular lacuna in the philosophy of science literature surrounding the role of exploratory
observations in scientific progress. Following Hacking (1983), interventionalists have argued
that it is the scientist’s intervention on physical systems that grounds increasing knowledge
about those systems. Plausible as this idea may be, if it is to apply to the observational or
1There has been a recent exchange in the philosophical literature on the topic of scientific progress in
which the connection to knowledge has received some attention, including contributions from Bird (2007,
2008); Mizrahi (2013); Mizrahi and Buckwalter (2014); Niiniluoto (2014); Rowbottom (2008, 2015). This
exchange has been primarily concerned with exposing intuitions about scientific progress by trading thought
experiments. However, it is far from clear how the philosophical approach of considering such hypothetical
vignettes relates to questions about progress in actual science.
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historical sciences, the intervention in question apparently has to be performed on a model
(perhaps via operations on a mathematical representation or a computer simulation) of the
system, or by counterfactual reasoning within a particular theoretical framework (Wood-
ward, 2004). However, I believe that there are reasons to think that this suggestion does not
yield the epistemic surrogate of the physical manipulation case. In order to understand how
epistemic progress can nevertheless be made in such domains, my project focuses heavily
(although not exclusively) on examples from astrophysics and cosmology—two paradigmat-
ically observational sciences. By attending to these examples I am in a position to supply
a general account of scientific progress, which might be obscured if one simply attended
to progress made in fields of experimental science where manipulation and intervention are
possible.
Any story of scientific inquiry has to get us from point A to point B and tell us what
happens in the middle. Point A is the nature side of the story, point B is the theory side, and
somehow or other these two need to be connected in the right sort of way. This dissertation
is structured such that, taken together, the chapters trace an arc from the nature side to
the theory side. Chapter 2 deals with the production of empirical data via interaction with
the natural world and Chapter 3 explicates the path between data records and constraints
on theorizing. Chapter 4 is a bit of an intermezzo, which discusses how the details of data
collection and processing end up mattering for adjudicating empirical adequacy and some of
the consequences this has for data stewardship. Chapter 5 picks the arc back up and carries it
forward to the point of contact between evidence and theory: empirical constraints. Finally,
in Chapter 6 I discuss how this story of scientific inquiry should be reflected in our epistemic
commitments.
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2.0 THE MINIMAL COMMITMENT OF EMPIRICISM
Empiricism has a curious status in the philosophy of science. It is at once part of the ordinary
and seemingly uncontroversial conceptual currency of the field, and at the same time slippery
and equivocal. In this chapter I articulate and defend a characterization of empiricism.
2.1 VARIETIES OF EMPIRICISM
The history of philosophy exhibits a variety of empiricisms.1 One can find diverse and
nuanced empiricisms for instance in the work of Epicurus, David Hume, up through the
logical empiricist movement and Bas van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism in the 20th
century. There are however, a relatively few central themes woven throughout. We can
identify three important empiricism theses, which can be divided into the theses constitutive
of what we might call Garden-variety Empiricism2 and a further thesis that, when combined
with the first two, yields what we might call Full-bore Empiricism. I will state the theses
first and then discuss them.
Garden-variety Empiricism Knowledge of nature derives from, and only from, experi-
ence.
 (Necessity of experience) To learn about the natural world, we must submit our
conceptions to the tribunal of experience.
1Lipton, Peter. (2015) puts it nicely: “There are almost as many empiricism as there are empiricists,
but what these views or approaches have in common is an emphasis on the importance of experience to
the formation of concepts and to the acquisition of knowledge. . . The range of empiricist positions is vast,
from the shocking view that all we can think or know about are our sensations to the mundane claims that
experience plays some role in the formation of some of our concepts and in the justification of some of our
beliefs” [567].
2This corresponds to what Lipton, Peter. (2015) calls “Knowledge Empiricism”, see p. 569.
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 (Opposition to rationalism) We do not gain knowledge about nature by contem-
plation in absence of experience.
Full-bore Empiricism
 (Opposition to realism) We ought not believe that our best ways of conceiving of
the world are true, but only that they cohere with our experience.
Garden-variety Empiricism is not as controversial a position as Full-bore Empiricism.
Realism about scientific theories is compatible with Garden-variety Empiricism. To get
to Full-bore Empiricism, one needs an additional premise. In particular, one needs to be
committed to the following:
(Appearance/world gap) Experience is mediated and never gives us access to nature
directly but always via ‘appearances’ that are contingent on our circumstances in the world,
e.g. our limited and particular faculties, scale, and the part of the world that we occupy in
space and time.
If this premise is true we will never be in an epistemic position that would warrant belief
that our theories are true, where truth is construed as correspondence. In other words,
if one is committed to the position that knowledge of nature derives from, and only from
experience (Garden-variety Empiricism) and in addition to a separation of the way nature
is independently of our experience of it and that very experience, then it will follow that the
best we can get is belief that our theories agree with our experience.
One could take this line of reasoning as grounds for pursuing a theory of truth besides
correspondence, such as a coherence or pragmatic theory of truth. However, a correspon-
dence theory of truth is apt for thinking about science that aims at understanding what
the natural world is like as opposed to generating conceptual frameworks that successfully
‘hang together’ or ‘work’. That a correspondence theory is the appropriate theory of truth
in this context and that we will never be in a position to judge that our theories are in fact
true in this sense are not inconsistent with one another. Moreover, proposing candidates for
correspondence can be fruitful for amassing empirical constraints on any viable framework
(and for generating frameworks that we choose to work within, while nevertheless abstaining
from making judgments about their truth).
Another option would be to reject that there is anything beyond/underneath the appear-
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ances and take the appearances themselves to be in a sense all that is really there.3 This
latter move is not exactly to embrace idealism, or skepticism, but rather to insist that the
appearances are the real. It is not entirely clear that such a view can be made coherent, and
if so that it would be a desirable way to construe what is going on in scientific inquiry. Be
this as it may, Garden-variety Empiricists who embrace the appearance/world gap and
are interested in truth as correspondence with the world beyond its appearances will have
to relinquish the idea that we are ever in a position to judge that we have obtained such
truths. In other words, they will be lead to Full-bore Empiricism.
Let us focus on explicating the necessity of experience thesis of Garden-variety Em-
piricism. What does it mean that “we must submit our conceptions to the tribunal of
experience”? Something like this thesis is, I think, a central component of the sort of em-
piricism that philosophers of science broadly want to endorse. Nevertheless there is a lot
more that needs to be said in order to explicate this thesis.
2.2 EXPLICATING THE ‘TRIBUNAL OF EXPERIENCE’
The term ‘experience’ connotes something at once familiar and vague. My experience of x
encompasses my interactions with x from my perspective–the appearance of x in the guises
in which I encounter it, for me. Experience construed broadly in the context of empiricism is
something like the totality of appearances presented to relevant epistemic agents. To say this
is not yet very helpful, especially when thinking about sophisticated contemporary science.
What for instance is the relevant sense of ‘appearances’? In the context of contemporary sci-
entific practices it is useful to explicate the necessity of experience thesis by transitioning
to speaking rather about empirical ‘evidence’. One important reason to do this is to signal
that the relevant sense of ‘experience’ goes beyond unaided human perception to include the
mediated experience of the world that is gained through sophisticated instrumentation and
technique.
3Nietzche does not advocate exactly this, but something nearby in his well-known aphorism 107 concluding
Book Two of The Gay Science (2001, 104-105).
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Another reason to speak of empirical evidence rather than experience is that the latter has
a much broader connotation than the former. My experience broadly construed includes my
experience of my dreams, hallucinations, imaginings, desires and so on. We ought to be very
careful about how these aspects of experience are supposed to inform a properly empiricist
position. They can in some contexts be understood as sources of empirical evidence (perhaps
with respect to for example our conception of the functioning of the human mind or brain). In
these cases in particular, thinking about evidence rather than experience is helpful because it
makes plain the sense in which the epistemic utility of even our most immediate experiences
(like desires) can be mediated.
Indeed, it has been a persistent mistake of empiricist positions to insist on a foundational
role for a kind of direct experience (an idea that traces at least all the way back to Epicurus).
Nothing important for Full-bore Empiricism is lost when we take the fuel that feeds our
increasing knowledge of what the world is like to be mediated evidence rather than direct
experience. This is because a Full-bore Empiricist already believes that there is a gap between
our experience of the world and what the world is really like independently of our experience.
Such an empiricist is already committed to thorough-going mediation of experience. For such
an empiricist, giving up direct experience does not amount to giving up the important sense
in which the necessity of experience thesis encodes the conduit through which world is
to ‘push back’ on our understanding of it–namely our interaction with the world. This is
because evidence is gathered by interaction with the world, mediated as that interaction
may be.
Transitioning to speaking of evidence rather than experience may be more problematic
for Garden-variety Empiricists who want to reject Full-bore Empiricism. Perhaps Garden-
variety Empiricists with realist aspirations hope that the access to the world given by direct
experience could ground our acceptance of our best scientific theories as true. There is an
onus on such aspiring realists to defend the claim that we have direct experience of the world
in the first place. In absence of such defense, we are stuck with Full-bore Empiricism.
How might the necessity of experience thesis be explicated in terms of empirical
evidence? Consider the following: either cherry-picking evidence is permissible or it is not.
Suppose cherry-picking is permissible. Then agents are free to engineer the adequacy of their
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theories as they please. Inconvenient evidence can simply be ignored. If anomalous results
turn up in the laboratory, one need not worry, these can just be summarily swept under the
rug.
To adopt the permissibility of cherry-picking evidence would clearly be antithetical to
the enterprise of empirical science. It would make the viability of a theory a matter of pure
whim and would sever the connection to nature that was supposed to be instantiated in the
necessity of experience thesis. Perhaps evidence can be set aside (although we should
be very careful to say what this means), but it ought not be set aside without good reason.
That the evidence is inconvenient is certainly not a good reason, and there may be other bad
reasons besides. Cherry-picking evidence is incompatible with Garden-variety Empiricism
and with Full-bore Empiricism, this much is clear. But what are we committed to if cherry-
picking is not permissible? What ‘tribunal’ precisely are we committed to saying that our
theories must face?
I will advocate for the following explication of the necessity of experience thesis:
The Minimal Commitment of Empiricism Good theories, whatever else they are, are
empirically adequate: they are consistent with all of the available empirical evidence.
Supporting the Minimal Commitment of Empiricism The Minimal Commitment
of Empiricism itself calls for explication, and the explication I will offer calls for defense. Let
us first note that one might reasonably argue that much else besides the Minimal Commit-
ment should be required of good scientific theories. However, to require any less of them
would open the door to theories inconsistent with the evidence. But that would be to give
up on the core distinguishing feature of science in comparison to other human pursuits. The
impermissibility of cherry-picking evidence is encoded in the prescription that empirical ad-
equacy is to obtain with respect to all of the available empirical evidence. To have any hope
of learning about nature from experience at all, the world has to be able to push back on
our understanding of it and the ‘pushing’ happens through the mechanism of maintaining
empirical adequacy.
Demanding consistency with all of the empirical evidence expresses the heuristic that
the more empirical constraints the better. This heuristic accords well with actual scientific
practice. If new observational or experimental evidence can be garnered, scientists generally
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consider it epistemically desirable to do so. This is evidenced not only in the fact that scien-
tists are perpetually appealing to funding agencies to build next generation experiments, but
also in the fact that scientists opportunistically gather data when convenient circumstances
present themselves. Similarly, if old evidence can be brought to bear on contemporary the-
orizing, that too is considered epistemically desirable.
Why should this be so? That is, why should having more empirical constraints be
desirable? One plausible reason is that adopting the heuristic that more constraints are
better serves as a mechanism for systematically dispensing with potential falsifying evidence.
Unchecked evidence is an epistemic liability in the sense that it could turn out to be falsifying.
Thus, one would like to examine the evidence if possible to remove the liability. Another
reason is that empirical adequacy is cheap when there are few constraints with which to
contend. That is, a theory from which no empirical consequences have been derived is
empirically adequate in the cheapest sense. Similarly, a theory in a world where no empirical
constraints have been generated, or all empirical constraints have been destroyed, is also
cheaply adequate. In contrast, we can learn more about what the world is like from a theory
that is consistent with many empirical constraints. Empirical constraints are the conduit
through which we learn what the world is like; we learn that any viable theoretical framework
must be consistent with the empirical evidence. Therefore the more evidence we have, the
more we have learned about what the world is like.
Note that the way I have formulated the Minimal Commitment here is not how van
Fraassen would do so. For van Fraassen, empirical adequacy is consistency with all of the
evidence that there ever could be, whether anyone ever actually gets a hold of it in practice or
not (see van Fraassen, 1980, 12-19). Thus, van Fraassen’s take on empirical adequacy relies
on the notion of what is observable rather than what is as a matter of fact observed by any
particular epistemic agent or agents. I have chosen not to follow van Fraassen on this point
but to instead characterize empirical adequacy with respect to the available evidence. This
has the consequence that an epistemic community could judge a theory to be empirically
adequate with respect to the evidence available at some initial time and then come to judge
that the same theory fails to be adequate with respect to the evidence available at some
later time. In contrast, if a theory is empirically adequate in van Fraassen’s sense at some
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time, it will always be so since the corpus of evidence on which such adequacy depends is
static–it does not depend on the actual status of scientific research. I take this difference
to count in favor of my formulation of the Minimal Commitment of Empiricism over that
implicated by van Fraassen’s view precisely because no one will ever actually be in a position
to judge the adequacy of a theory with respect to all of the evidence that is observable in
van Fraassen’s sense. A notion of empirical adequacy relevant to science in practice should
pick out something that real scientists are in fact in a position to adjudicate–it should be
relevant to real epistemic agents.
We should note that adhering to the Minimal Commitment does not commit one to na¨ıve
falsificationism. In particular, that good theories need to be consistent with the available
evidence does not mean that whenever a theory encounters anomalous evidence that it should
be abandoned without further regard. The Minimal Commitment leaves open the possibility
that it may be reasonable to work on, or keep around, a theory that is inconsistent with the
available evidence as far as we know. But it does mean that when theories are inconsistent
with some relevant evidence, something has eventually got to give.
We should also note that not all scientific theories need be subject to the Minimal
Commitment. Scientists sometimes investigate theories primarily for their intrinsic interest
or instrumental value.4 With this in mind, what makes a theory “good” in the farthest
reaches of mathematical physics on one hand, or in applied and synthetic sciences on the
other, need not necessarily involve empirical adequacy. The Minimal Commitment applies
only to theories that are supposed to be theories of our actual world.5
4I have in mind a very broad sense of “theory” here, encompassing formal entities like sets of axioms and
the models that satisfy them, as well as hypotheses expressed as propositions and even imprecise mixtures
of mathematics and narrative components.
5Attending to the appropriate scope of the Minimal Commitment dispels the apparent tension between the
present work and that of Bhakthavatsalam and Cartwright (2017), when they write “to mandate empirical
adequacy as a minimum criterion for a scientific theory is entirely unreasonable and just wrong” [6, original
emphasis]. Those authors are particularly interested in theories scientists use for “managing the world”
[5]. Indeed, they state explicitly: “we have no quarrel with empirical adequacy as an indicator of theory
acceptability when acceptability is to be judged in terms of truth: a theory with false implications cannot
be true, whether its implications are about empirical phenomena or something else. But there are lots of
other things one can intend by labeling a theory ‘acceptable’” [3].
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2.3 RE-CASTING FULL-BORE EMPIRICISM
With the explication of the necessity of experience thesis provided in the previous section
in hand, we can return to the three empiricist theses introduced in the first section and see
how they may be recast in light of it. I offer the following interpretation of the theses:
Garden-variety Empiricism Knowledge of nature derives from, and only from, expe-
rience. That is, our knowledge about what the world is like derives from, and only from,
empirical evidence.
 (Necessity of experience) To learn about the natural world, we must submit our
conceptions to the tribunal of experience. That is, good theories, whatever else they
are, are empirically adequate: they are consistent with all of the available empirical
evidence (Minimal Commitment of Empiricism).
 (Opposition to rationalism) We do not gain knowledge about nature by contem-
plation in absence of experience. That is, we do not gain knowledge about nature by
contemplation in absence of empirical evidence.
[(Appearance/world gap) Experience is mediated and never gives us access to nature
directly but always via ‘appearances’ that are contingent on our circumstances in the world,
e.g. our limited and particular faculties, scale, and the part of the world that we occupy
in space and time. That is, empirical evidence is mediated and never gives us us access to
nature directly but rather through results that are contingent on our circumstances in the
world, e.g. our limited and particular faculties, instruments, techniques, scale, and the part
of the world that we occupy in space and time.]
Full-bore Empiricism
 (Opposition to realism) We ought not believe that our best ways of conceiving of
the world are true, but only that they cohere with our experience. That is, we ought
not believe that our best theories are true, but only that they are consistent with the
available evidence.
Recasting the theses of empiricism in this manner pushes the task of their explication
to the problem of specifying what the empirical evidence is with respect to which scientific
theories should be adequate. Providing a characterization of empirical evidence appropriate
for this role is the subject of chapter 3. First, however, we ought to inquire into what makes
something distinctively empirical in the first place.
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2.4 WHAT IS DISTINCTIVELY ‘EMPIRICAL’?
An empiricist position ought to be able to distinguish the empirical from, for instance, the
virtual if it is to remain faithful to the Minimal Commitment of Empiricism. The
tribunal of experience ought to originate from the world lest empiricism lose what makes it
distinctive from rationalism. In certain contrived circumstances it will be easy to discern
the empirical from the non-empirical. Suppose a scientist forgets to record an entry in the
laboratory notebook and to fill in the blank just makes up a number to record where the
datum should be. For most epistemic contexts, this entry in the laboratory notebook would
not be empirical in the relevant sense. Indeed, such a scientist could plausibly be accused of
fraud. The provenance of the datum in question is the imagination of the scientist, not the
worldly target of research. The exception of course would be if the worldly target happens
to in fact be that scientist’s imagination.
Consider another relatively straightforward case. Suppose a scientist designs a computer
simulation in order to explore how the characteristics of a model respond to a variety inputs.
Such a scientist could make records of the outputs of the simulation, and we might want to
call these data, but we would not want to call them empirical data since their provenance
is the simulation rather than the world. Again, there are special circumstances in which
such data might be considered empirical data—as when the worldly target of research is the
computational system itself rather that whatever the model was suppose to represent in the
first place. In general though, we do well to distinguish between the virtual data produced
from simulations and empirical data got by interaction in some manner with a worldly target
of study.
There are, however, many circumstances for which it is not quite so straightforward to
determine what is empirical and what is not. Two kinds cases are of particular interest. The
first kind are cases in which the data is clearly empirical, but there is some question about how
the worldly source of their provenance is related to the worldly target of interest. Consider
an example that we will return to below: data collected from terrestrial fusion experiments
that is purportedly relevant to the physical processes involved in distant supernovae.
The second kind of case that we ought to consider more carefully involves data that are
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sourced from the worldly target of interest, but for which the data collection process involves
the outputs of simulations. An example of this second sort of case, which has been discussed
extensively by Morrison (cf. 2009, 2015), is high energy particle physics data collected at the
the Large Hadron Collider.
In the first kind of case, at first glance, the data appear to be empirical but in the wrong
sort of way. But what precisely has gone wrong? In the second kind of case, the data appear
to be hybrid in nature—partly empirical, partly simulated. Ought such hybrid data count
as empirical in the relevant sense?
In this chapter, I will argue that data are empirical with respect to target T when there
is an interpretation of the provenance of those data using the resources of epistemic context
C such that the data are products of causal interaction with T. Thus, data can only be to
judged to be empirical in a relational way. Data are empirical with respect to a target and an
epistemic context. As will be readily apparent, this has the consequence that the very same
data record can be empirical with respect to some target and context and simultaneously
not empirical with respect to some other target and context. Explicating the empirical in
this way will allow us to pronounce on the two kinds of troublesome cases introduced above.
This way of characterizing the distinctively empirical is not without precedent in the
philosophy of science literature on measurement.6 For instance, van Fraassen (2012) articu-
lates the context sensitivity of the empirical nature of data as follows: “Whether a procedure
counts as a measurement and, if so, what it measures are questions that have, in general,
answers only relative to a theory” (774). Likewise, Parker (2017) emphasizes the causal
production of data when she writes: “Measuring is an activity that involves, among other
things, physical interaction with the system being measured” (285).
2.4.1 Data are empirical relative to a target and a context
Data are empirical relative to a target. Without specifying a target it is impossible to
say whether some particular data are empirical or not. That this must be so is easy to see.
Suppose a colleague hands you a table of values indicating the height of all of the high tides
6See also Tal (2013).
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on a certain beach over the last year as she measured them. You wonder “are these empirical
data?” The answer depends on the target we consider. When considered with respect to the
tides, the data are indeed empirical. However, when considered with respect to any number
of other targets—the stock market, for instance—these data are not empirical.
One might be tempted to say that if a data set is empirical with respect to some target,
then that data set is empirical full stop. This would be ill-advised however, because it
would be so permissive as to invite unnecessary confusion. For instance, it would then be
permissible to say that simulation outputs, dream diaries, and characteristics of certain works
of art are empirical data since there are indeed some targets with respect to which each of
these records are empirical data. As mentioned above, simulation outputs could be empirical
data with respect to the state of the computational system that produced them. Likewise,
dream diaries could plausibly contain empirical data with respect to the sleep processes of
the person who’s dreams they record, and records of the characteristics of a works of art
might plausibly constitute empirical data with respect to the evolution of the artist’s style
and technique. These are special circumstances. In general we would not want to say that
simulation outputs, dream diaries, or the characteristics of artworks are empirical evidence
because to do so would invite confusion. It would invite the mistake of construing these sort
of records as empirical data with respect to other worldly targets.
Data are empirical relative to an epistemic context and the epistemic context
supplies the resources with which the data are interpreted. Data never speaks for
itself, but rather always requires interpretive resources. If a colleague hands you a table of
values, without further context you will not be in a position to say whether those values
are empirical data or not. You will need the resources of an epistemic context to help you
interpret the what the values are values of, what their significance is, and to discern for what
purposes the data may be used and whether and what further processing may be required for
those purposes. In particular, you will need enough background theory to furnish a causal
story connecting the worldly target of interest to the data collection and recording process.
Insofar as many data collection processes involve detectors, measuring apparatuses, or other
technical apparatuses, the resources in the epistemic context required to tell whether the
data is empirical or not will likely include both theories and/or models of the target system,
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the technical equipment involved in data collection, and the intervening causal processes.
An epistemic context, in the sense I intend here, is just the collection of conceptual,
theoretical and representational resources from the perspective of which the data is to be
interpreted. It would be simpler to call the epistemic context “a theory”, as van Fraassen
does when he writes in the passage already quoted, that whether a procedure counts as
a measurement has an answer “only relative to a theory”. However, as this obscures the
role that models, hypotheses, assumptions, definitions, and other such resources play in
interpreting data I prefer to speak of “epistemic contexts”, which I take to be inclusive
enough to encompass these other resources that we might not want to call theories. This
distinction allows those who so desire to reserve a more restrictive and formal definition for
“scientific theory”, as for example a set of axioms and the mathematical models that satisfy
them.
The epistemic context need not be the original context of production. Data
can be used for the specific purpose for which they were gathered and data can sometimes
be used for purposes for which they were not initially intended. To take a simple exam-
ple, data records of barometer readings could be used (as initially intended) to generate
constraints on theorizing about atmospheric pressure and (opportunistically) to generate
constraints on theorizing about the altitude from which the readings were collected using
further background information about the relation between barometric pressure and altitude
in the relevant context.
Since whether data are empirical or not depends on the epistemic context from which
they are interpreted, it is possible to have data that were initially interpreted as empirical
with respect to some target using the resources available at the time of their production, but
that are later interpreted as not empirical with respect to that target using the resources
of some subsequent epistemic context. For instance, the OPERA data that was initially
used to support the existence of superluminal neutrinos, was subsequently reinterpreted as
the epistemic context shifted in such a way that no longer afforded the right sort of causal
connection between neutrinos and the data in question due to a faulty connection in the
experimental apparatus.
Once data has been interpreted as empirical with respect to some target is it ever possible
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to reinterpret it in light of a subsequent epistemic context such that it ceases to be interpreted
as empirical at all? Insofar as the data have been produced by some causal process, one
could hope that there would always be some target with respect to which the data could
be interpreted as empirical. Unfortunately, it could be the case that none of the available
epistemic contexts can furnish a substantive enough causal story of the production of the
data. That is, it could be that the causal processes involved in the production of the data
in question are so poorly characterized by any available epistemic context, that no one is in
a position to say what causally generated the data.
Under an interpretation, the provenance of empirical data involves causal
interaction with the target. An important feature of the view of empirical data that I
am defending is the causal production of data. To be properly empirical, data should have
been produced by causal processes that connect the worldly target of research to the process
of data collection and recording from the perspective of the epistemic context in which the
data are to be interpreted. There is no perspective outside of an epistemic context from which
the causal processes can be identified and traced. Indeed, there is no perspective outside of
an epistemic context from which a worldly target can be identified in the first place. Yet,
using the resources of an epistemic context, it can be possible to answer the question: were
these data produced by causal interaction with the target?
Why is it important for their empirical character that data be connected by causal
processes to worldly targets? One important reason in support of this approach is that
if one does not require the causal production of data, one risks collapsing the distinction
between empirical data and virtual data. We should like to be able to say that the outputs
of a simulation of X are of X without having been causally produced by X. The products
of models and simulations can stand relations to worldly targets, for instance representation
relations, without having been produced by those targets.
To see why causal production matters, let us consider a characterization of what makes
data empirical that eschews causal production and relies instead on ostension. I will suggest
that this view suffers from a serious drawback—it is not easy to see how it could be applied
to data sourced from far away worldly targets that no one can point to in an act of ostension.
The characterization I want to consider comes from an insightful and philosophically
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valuable paper by Matthias Kaiser (1991) titled “From Rocks to Graphs—The Shaping of
Phenomena”. In this paper, Kaiser develops an abstract characterization of the epistemolog-
ical structure that carries scientific reasoning from what he calls “observable reality (data)”
to “empirical phenomena” (121). As the title of the paper intimates, Kaiser traces out this
structure for a concrete case study, from geological specimens gathered in the field (rocks),
through data collected via the manipulation and transformation of these specimens in the
laboratory (values of their magnetic declination and inclination), finally to claims about
phenomena (continental drift). I will not review all of the details of Kaiser’s epistemologi-
cal picture. Suffice it to say that the basic elements of an instance of the structure are an
anchor-point and inference tickets. Roughly, the anchor-point is the bit of the world that
source the data, and the inference tickets transform the data by redescription and other
operations licensed by theoretical resources (either via bootstrapping or the incorporation
of accepted background theory), which might include incorporating data collected in other
contexts (cf. ibid., 122-123). In Kaiser’s geological case study, the anchor-point is just the
“rocks in situ which can be pointed out by the paleomagnetist” (122).
For present purposes, what matters is that for Kaiser, the anchor-points are material
objects picked out by ostension in what he calls “experiential anchoring” (125). He writes:
“all data structures are ‘anchored’ in objects of immediate experience. One keeps track of
these objects in the sense that the material basis of the layer-set of data can always be
recovered” (122). Although Kaiser goes on to formalize these intuitions—“anchor-point”
becomes “0-structure” and so on—the gist of the idea is as follows:
[The 0-structure] consists of the objects of the scientific inquiry together with the simple
act of presentation. My basic intuition is here that scientific data rest on raw material
that can be presented, or reproduced, upon request. It is essential that this level is kept
as simple as possible, e.g., “this rock here”, or “these spots on the screen there”, or —
in social science — “these filled-in questionnaires”, etc. The 0-structure contains all those
things that are to be subjected to scientific scrutiny, i.e., that are to be measured, weighed,
radiated, dissoluted, accelerated, etc. (125)
Thus, on Kaiser’s view, what makes data empirical are these original (and reproducible)
acts of ostension, like “this rock here”. As I hinted above, I believe that Kaiser’s view is
ill-suited to far away targets in virtue of this feature of his account. On this account, when
the material specimen is not present at hand, the scientist cannot anchor the data to it via
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acts of ostension like “this rock here”. Instead, on this account she is forced to anchor her
data, not to the worldly target of interest, but to some intermediary as in “these spots on
the screen there”. Let us consider an example of this sort. Figure 1 shows a visualization of
data from the Arecibo telescope, displaying “spots” that can be interpreted as radio signals
from distant galaxies.
Figure 1: Data from the Arecibo radio telescope. Sourced from http://egg.astro.
cornell.edu/alfalfa/ugradteam/hunt09/hunt2_09.htm. Thank you to Martha P.
Haynes for permission to use this image.
On Kaiser’s account, what makes the data visualized in Figure 1 empirical is that they
can be picked out by ostension, by some scientist gesturing to the image—“these spots on
the screen there”. This approach locates the empirical at the site where some bit of the
world is present to perception of a human inquirer. In this case, the spots in the image
are what is present to the inquirer. But approach seems to miss the point. The data
displayed in Figure 1 are empirical data with respect to galaxies—they are data encoding
the radio frequency emissions of galaxies over time—in virtue of being produced by the
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interaction of electromagnetic radiation emitted by those galaxies traveling through space
an interacting with the receiver of the Arecibo observatory telescope and subsequently the
rest of the readout apparatus of that telescope. We should of course note that this causal
interaction story is told using conceptual resources of a variety of theories that make up
an epistemic context, including for this instance, theories regarding the composition and
behavior of galaxies, electromagnetism, theories of electronics, and so on.
Moreover, Kaiser’s approach has the consequence of making everything that can be picked
out by ostension in this manner empirical. But this is just the problem that we have already
discussed above, namely, it invites confusing virtual data (data generated by simulation or
imagination) for empirical data.
In light of these difficulties, I suggest that we are better off giving up the impulse to find
an experiential foundation for the empirical character of empirical data in the first place.
Let us consider another, more recent approach to defining data, that of Leonelli (2015).
For Leonelli, data is roughly any product of scientific research that is packaged for dissemi-
nation for the purpose of serving as evidence. In particular, she defines data “as a relational
category applied to research outputs that are taken, at specific moments of inquiry, to provide
evidence for knowledge claims of interest to the researchers involved” (811). In particular,
data is
any product of research activities, ranging from artifacts such as photographs to symbols
such as letters or numbers, which is collected, stored, and disseminated in order to be used
as evidence for knowledge claims [...] what matters is that observations or measurements
are collected with the expectation that they may be used as evidence for claims about the
world in the future. Hence, any object can be considered as a datum as long as (1) it is
treated as potential evidence for one or more claims about phenomena and (2) it is possible
to circulate it among individuals. (817)
Note that Leonelli’s definition of data is clearly relational—data is data in part in virtue
of being potential evidence. Her view does not rely explicitly on an experiential foundation
anchoring it to material objects present to the perception of a human inquirer. Yet, it is not
clear that Leonelli’s view sufficiently emphasizes the importance of the causal production
of empirical data either. That data must be produced from physical interaction with the
appropriate target system may be implicit in Leonelli’s view. Plausibly (reasonable) scientists
would not have the expectation that products of research activities could be used as evidence
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for claims about the world if they were not produced by physical interaction with the relevant
parts of the world. But we do better to be explicit that causal production is a necessary
condition for being empirical data.
Epistemic contexts also supply the resources for identifying and interpreting
casual interactions. It will be noted that the view of what makes data empirical espoused
here relies on the notion of a casual interaction. I am not committed to a special theory of
causal interaction. In fact, I believe that this view of what makes data empirical is probably
compatible with a variety of ways of explicating the notion of causal interaction. I take this
flexibility as a virtue of the view because, with Norton (2003) I doubt that it will be possible
to identify once and for all a universal causal principle that can capture all of the reasonable
stories about causal interaction that scientists want to tell. In particular I agree with Norton
that the notion of causality varies according to scientific domain:
The sort of causation we recover in physical systems is not quite the same as the sort
we recover in biological domains, for example. Finally, our notion of causation evolves in
response to developments in the science. May causes act a distance? Is causation anything
more than determinism? The answers depend on who you ask and when you ask; and those
differences in part result from developments in the relevant science. (15)
Nevertheless, without some causal story furnished by an epistemic context, data will not be
hooked up to the worldly target of interest in the right sort of way. Context sensitive as it
may be, there must be some way of articulating how the target is the source of the data via
interaction with the intervening objects and/or processes that result in the data records.
How detailed must the causal story connecting the target to the data be? Can one
simply stipulate, drawing on the resources of one’s epistemic context that the target causally
produced the data, and leave it at that? For instance, suppose one’s favorite theory of
fundamental physics says that all physical objects are composed of strings. Could one then
just say of any data, whatever it is, that it was causally produced by the interaction of the
strings without supplying the intervening details?
There are three things I would like to say here. First, for a given context scientists may
have good reason to pay close attention to the details of the intermediary processes that
connect the target and the data. For instance, that some cosmic microwave background
(CMB) photons interact with electrons in galaxy clusters (the Sunyaev-Zel’dovich effect)
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on their way from the last scattering surface to the site at which they interact with our
detectors matters for interpreting the data thereby produced. In particular, it is in virtue
of this effect that the CMB data can be used to constrain theories about galaxy clustering.
Similarly, avoiding or subtracting artifacts or sources of systematic error in data often relies
on characterizing such intermediary processes. In the case of the CMB, an example of this
would be the effect of the interaction of the CMB photons with dust encountered along their
journeys. In other words, in addition to a causal story connecting the target and the data,
an epistemic context can also furnish details about the intervening processes that can be
used in interpreting the data.
Second, scientists are not likely to be satisfied with the minimal causal story—that the
target simply “causally produced the data”. This is because filling in the causal details
can be a promising way to tease out strategies for eliminating competition among theories.
The naively minimal causal story, that the strings causally produced the data, can be told
equally well for loops, causal sets, little Platonic solids, or whatever else you fancy. To break
this sort of underdetermination, which is something that scientists are interested in doing
where possible, one would want to see if distinguishing features might extracted from the
competing alternatives by filling out the details and if differential empirical results could
somehow be generated.
Third, regardless of whether the causal story connecting target and data is sketchy or
flush with details, insofar as there is a causal story to be told at all, the data can be
distinguished as empirical rather than virtual with respect to a specified target, and it is
this distinction that will help us make sense of the troublesome cases to which we now turn.
2.4.2 Troublesome cases
Stars in jars Philosophers of science have claimed that there are no experiments in astro-
physics. Hacking (1989) writes: “Galactic experimentation is science fiction, while extra-
galactic experimentation is a bad joke” (559). Morrison (2015), somewhat less polemically,
writes:
there are a variety of contexts where CSs [computer simulations] do take centre stage as
the source of experimental knowledge simply because the systems we are interested in are
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inaccessible to us. An example is the evolution of spiral structure in galaxies. Because the
typical time and distance scales are so vast, the only way experiments can be performed is
by simulating the system on a computer and experimenting on the simulation [...] In the
astrophysics case we may want to say that simulation is an acceptable source of experimental
knowledge simply because we are unable to conduct materially based experiments in the
way we can with other types of systems. (213-214)
In stark contrast to these philosophers, there are several research efforts that scientists
themselves are happy to call astrophysical experiments. The Harvard-Smithsonian Center
for Astrophysics boasts research under the heading “Laboratory Astrophysics”, ADMX is the
acronym for the Axion Dark Matter Experiment, and there is a Laboratory for Underground
Nuclear Astrophysics at Gran Sasso. How should we understand the data that are being
produced by these (terrestrial laboratory) “astrophysical experiments”?
To make the puzzle more concrete, let us consider a specific example of a laboratory
bound astrophysics experiment. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory uses a 4 MJ laser facility to study matter in high-energy-density states,
including nucleosynthesis in stars and supernovae, instabilities in supernovae, opacity of
stars, black hole accretion, nuclear reactions in stars, and planetary interiors—in short:
astrophysics.
The data gathered from NIF experiments is clearly empirical in that it is not the result of
a computer simulation or imagined in an sense. But is it really astrophysical empirical data?
After all, the experiments at NIF are not performed by intervening on stars themselves. Are
the scientists just wrong to call such activities astrophysical experiments? Is this just a “bad
joke”?
I suggest that the view of what makes data empirical articulated above helps to clarify
this situation. NIF data are empirical with respect to high-energy-density states of matter
and their behavior since there is an interpretation of the provenance of those data such that
they are the products of the causal interaction of the matter energized and confined by the
NIF lasers with the laboratory detectors systems. Insofar such high-energy-density states are
instantiated in far away astrophysical systems also, the data gathered in NIF experiments
can be used to constrain astrophysical theorizing.
Hybrid data Let us now turn to our second troublesome case, data that has been
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produced by a hybrid process involving causal interaction with some worldly target of interest
and via the involvement of computer simulations. For concreteness, consider the following
description of just such a case from Morrison (2015):
Although it is obvious that no simulation can prove that the Higgs particle exists, experi-
ments and equipment designed to discover the Higgs rely heavily on knowledge produced
via simulation. Hence, to say that the discovery of the Higgs was only possible using sim-
ulation is by no means to overstate the case. Again, not only is simulation required to
process the experimental or ‘signal’ data but simulation provides the foundation for the en-
tire experiment. To put the point in a slightly more perspicuous way, simulation knowledge
is what tells us where to look for a Higgs event, that a Higgs event has occurred, and that
we can trust the overall capability of the collider itself. In that sense the mass measurement
associated with the discovery is logically and causally dependent on simulation. (288)
Parker (2017) makes a similar claim:
computer simulations on their own cannot be processes by which we measure the target
systems being simulated, because they do not involve interaction (or even attempted in-
teraction) with those target systems. Nevertheless, in principle, computer simulations can
be embedded in studies that do involve this interaction and, indeed, can be embedded in
them in ways such that results from simulations constitute raw instrument readings or even
measurement outcomes. (289-290)
Indeed, Morrison goes on to claim that this example shows that “any sharp distinction be-
tween simulation and experiment practically meaningless” (289).7 In light of this description,
we might ask: is data generated at the Large Hadron Collider empirical?
Using the view of what makes data empirical articulated above, we can clearly say that
the LHC data implicated in the Higgs discovery are empirical since there is an interpretation
of the provenance of those data such that they are the products of causal processes connecting
Higgs particles to the detector data. From within the framework of standard model particle
physics, and with the help of many other resources besides, one can tell a (in this case
quite complicated) causal story connecting the Higgs particles to the production of the data.
Identifying the data as empirical in this sense does not at all diminish the importance of
simulations and other resources for putting the data to use. Moreover, identifying LHC
data as empirical with respect to the Higgs in this context preserves the distinction between
virtual data from virtual Higgs decays simulated on a computer and the actual LHC data,
7Morrison’s claim is not just that the distinction between simulation and experiment—between virtual
data and empirical data—disappears in the particular context of high energy particle physics research at the
LHC, but rather more generally insofar as LHC research is taken as paradigmatically experimental research.
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which as Morrison admits could not have replaced the data produced at the accelerator for
the purpose at hand.
In this chapter we have been concerned with the question: what makes data empirical as
opposed to virtual? I have argued for a relational and context dependent view of what makes
data empirical that emphasizes the causal production of data. In the following chapter I will
present a view that connects empirical data to constraints on theorizing via processing and
analysis. This view aims to supply an account of empirical evidence that both does what
an empiricist wants it to do and at the same time respects the roles a variety of epistemic
resources, including simulation outputs, assumptions, and models, play in interpreting and
using the products of empirical research.8
8Ultimately I think Parker might well be sympathetic to this move since she explicitly states that readers
who find her usage of “measurement” too permissive can treat her piece “as a discussion of how computer




Traditionally, empiricism has relied on the specialness of human observation, yet science is
rife with sophisticated instrumentation and techniques. This chapter advances a conception
of empirical evidence applicable to actual scientific practice. I argue that this conception
elucidates how the results of scientific research can be repurposed across diverse epistemic
contexts—it helps to make sense of how evidence accumulates across theory change, how
different evidence can be amalgamated and used jointly, and how the same evidence can be
used to constrain competing theories in the service of breaking local underdetermination.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The epistemology of science ought to include some account of empirical constraints on the-
orizing about nature. It does not help to say merely that the world ‘pushes back,’ or to
appeal as Quine did to the “tribunal of experience”. Veiled by these metaphors is something
very important—the thing that makes natural science distinctively empirical.
Whatever we philosophers of science want to say about this ‘pushing’ or ‘tribunal,’ it
ought to accommodate not only naked eye observations but the sort of results germane to
the sophisticated machinations of contemporary technology-ridden science. The fact that the
output of scientific instrumentation eventually needs to make a trans-cranial journey in order
to be of any real epistemic interest ought not mislead us into thinking that the empirical
is best understood as ‘observable’ or ‘sensible.’ Indeed, this was the sticking point for van
Fraassen’s constructive empiricism for many of the philosophers of science who engaged with
that view. Making what is observable to creatures like us the linchpin of one’s empiricist
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philosophy of science ends up ostracizing much of what scientists actually do in practice and
does not seem to get at what makes something distinctively empirical anyway.1
If not observations, what does constrain our theorizing about nature such that some
theories are empirically viable and some are not? In the hope of replacing observations with
something more suitable to science in practice, we might consider the more generic ‘empirical
results,’ where ‘results’ may be understood to include observations and other sensings but
also the results of technology-aided detections and measurements, and ‘empirical’ may be
understood in contrast with ‘virtual’ and ‘imagined’ and could be cashed out by appeal to
a causal story connecting the target of interest to the generation of that result.
This first attempt encounters an immediate worry: empirical results are typically gen-
erated and interpreted by recruiting significant theoretical resources. The connectedness,
or intertwining of the theoretical and empirical is often associated with the sort of holism
attributed to Duhem and Quine.2 Thus, the role of Quine’s tribunal of experience is to
judge not individual statements about the external world, but the whole “corporate body”
of such statements (Quine, 1951, 38). Indeed, according to Quine: “The unit of empirical
significance is the whole of science” (ibid., 39). This holism is then taken to have the con-
sequence that there is much flexibility in accommodating recalcitrant evidence, and indeed
that nothing forces one way of accommodating rather than another. Thus, according to
Duhem:
the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole
group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what
he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and
ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed.
(1974, 187)
Duhem and Quine both respond to this quandary with pragmatic resources: for Duhem, the
physicist’s ‘good sense’ and for Quine a penchant for conservatism and simplicity. Inviting
theory into our conception of the empirical therefore seems to have the unfortunate conse-
quence of making scientific theory choice a matter of pragmatics, rather than conformity with
1Van Fraassen himself begins to address this problem in his work on measurement and measuring instru-
ments (van Fraassen, 2008). I will have more to say about the views of 21st century van Fraassen below in
section 3.3.
2I would like to acknowledge anonymous referees for pushing me to clarify how my view of enriched
evidence relates to what is often called the Quine-Duhem problem.
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experience. The effect of all this is that what was distinctively empirical about empirical
science drops out of view.
The intertwining of the theoretical and empirical to which Duhem and Quine brought at-
tention has been absorbed into philosophy of science since the practice turn as the lesson that
the epistemic utility of empirical results depends crucially on the details of their provenance.
One must understand the concepts and assumptions that have shaped the presentation of
the result in order to use it in an epistemically responsible way.
However, it has not yet been widely appreciated that appeal to the auxiliary information
associated with the provenance of empirical results solves several questions left open at least
since the logical empiricist program dwindled. In particular:
1. How can evidence accumulate across theory change?
2. How can evidence be combined and used jointly?
3. How can the same evidence be used to constrain competing theories?
These questions are not independent of one another—they all concern the relationship be-
tween epistemic utility and context. To accumulate, evidence must outlive its original con-
text. To be used jointly, differently-sourced evidence must be amenable to the same context.
To constrain competing theories, the same evidence must be adaptable to different contexts.
What I want to argue here is that with the right understanding of empirical evidence we
can appreciate the sense in which the intertwining of the theoretical and empirical actually
affords epistemic activities that we care about, and it does so in such a way that what makes
empirical science distinctively empirical remains in view. I will argue that the epistemic
utility of empirical results depends on the details of their provenance, and that this depen-
dence is what makes possible the accumulation and amalgamation of evidence and indeed
the breaking of local underdetermination. The main contribution of this argument will be
to show how empiricism can embrace theory-riddled evidence.
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3.2 ENRICHED EVIDENCE
The history of philosophy exhibits a variety of empiricisms (cf. Lipton, Peter., 2015). The
shared gestalt is that knowledge of nature derives from, and only from, experience. Of
course “experience” is vague, and what gives any empiricism substance is an explication of
this concept. Let me begin by presenting the view that I think is required if empiricism is to
remain relevant in the face of the increasingly intricate instruments and techniques prevalent
in scientific research today. To this end it will be best to leave behind talk of “experience”
right away and speak instead of empirical evidence. Minimally, an empiricist should be
committed to requiring that theories of the natural world be consistent with the available
empirical evidence. To do otherwise would betray the very heart of the empiricism—it would
sever the connection by which the world could possibly ‘push back,’ by which the ‘tribunal’
could possibly judge. Note that requiring that theories be consistent with the evidence
does not commit one to na¨ıve falsificationism. In particular, that good theories need to
be consistent with the available empirical evidence does not mean that whenever a theory
encounters anomalous evidence that it should be abandoned without further regard since
it may be reasonable to work on, or keep around, a theory that is inconsistent with the
available evidence as far as we know. But it does mean that when theories are inconsistent
with evidence, something has eventually got to give. An inconsistency between theory and
evidence cannot persist if the theory is to be empirically viable. The ground-level task of
giving substance to empiricism now becomes explicating the notion of empirical evidence.
With respect to what exactly are our theories supposed to be consistent?
Given the centrality of the notion of evidence in philosophy of science, it is surprisingly
difficult to find explicit characterizations of it. This situation is captured well by van Fraassen
(1984):
What is the main epistemic problem concerning science? I take it that it is the explication
of how we compare and evaluate theories, as a basis either for theory acceptance or for
practical action. This comparison is clearly a comparison in the light of the available
evidence–whatever that means. (27)
van Fraassen’s appraisal remains salient with respect to the contemporary literature, which
rarely defines evidence explicitly and often passes over the issue over in silence by dealing
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abstractly with “evidence e”.
Thorough explication of the view I want to advance, the enriched view of evidence,
will have to proceed in several stages, and will be aided by the introduction of some new
conceptual resources. However, let me state the view right away with the caveat that the
unfamiliar terms will be defined and illustrated in due course.
Enriched evidence The evidence with respect to which empirical adequacy is to be adju-
dicated is made up of lines of evidence enriched by auxiliary information about how those
lines were generated. By “line of evidence” I mean a sequence of empirical results including
the records of data collection and all subsequent products of data processing generated on
the way to some final empirical constraint. By auxiliary information, I mean the metadata
regarding the provenance of the data records and the processing workflow that transforms
them. Together, a line of evidence and its associated metadata compose what I am calling
an “enriched line of evidence”. The evidential corpus is then to be made up of many such
enriched lines of evidence.
This characterization of evidence is sympathetic with the spirit of characterizations given
by other philosophers of science who attend carefully to scientific practice. For instance,
Bogen and Woodward (2005) emphasize the fact that “evidential relevance depends upon
features of the causal processes by which the evidence is produced” (240). I agree with Bogen
and Woodward (and Woodward (2011)) that philosophers of science need to attend more
closely to data generating processes in our efforts to understand the epistemic relevance of
evidence. In their chapter in the edited volume Evidence, Inference and Enquiry Chang and
Fisher (2011) argue for “the intrinsic contextuality of evidence” and for the importance of
locating evidence within purposeful epistemic activities, operations, and procedures. Perovic
(2017) argues for a “relaxed stance” towards calibration procedures that incorporate past
empirical results, theory, and the outcomes of the very experiments under consideration
that is compatible with empiricism broadly construed (cf. his section 6). I hope that the
characterization of empirical evidence introduced in the present work will be a welcome
elucidation of a concept of central significance to philosophers working in this problem space.
I will say a bit more below to locate my view with respect to van Fraassen (2008) and Leonelli
(2009, 2016). Before I do, I should further unpack the notion of enriched evidence. To this
end it will be useful to further countenance two important components of the characterization
given above: empirical results and metadata.
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Empirical results Here is a generic sketch of the generation of an empirical constraint.
Let us focus on two (roughly delineated) stages of empirical research: data collection and
data processing. In the first stage data is collected and recorded. Sometimes the data
collected is observational and the collection consists in unaided human perception which is
then codified in some record, as may be the case for naked-eye astronomical observations,
such as gazing at the Moon. However, as we have already noted above, data is often,
especially in contemporary science, collected using instruments and or techniques.
In the second stage, data may be processed in a variety of ways. The original records
of data collection typically sustain “cleaning”, “cuts”, “reduction” and calibration as they
are transformed into models of data. For instance, the process of reducing a set of images
from a digital telescope might involve 1) correcting each exposure (bias subtraction, flat field
correction, bad pixel masking), 2) calibrating each exposure astrometrically and photomet-
rically 3) modeling the point spread function in each exposure, 4) remapping each exposure
to a common coordinate system, 5) co-adding exposures, etc. 3
Furthermore, in order to construct an empirical result that is appropriately formulated to
constrain some theory, for example to calculate the empirical value of a particular parameter
or to produce a proposition, much more processing than preliminary data reduction will
typically be required. The target system under study may have to be modeled and the data
interpreted in light of that model. Anderl (2016) gives a nice example of this sort of modeling
in radio astronomy:
the recording of data using a single dish radio telescope requires a model of the mechanical
and optical properties of the telescope mirror in different positions in order to determine the
exact pointing position. For the calibration of data with respect to atmospheric influences,
a model of the Earth’s atmosphere is needed. Flux calibration presupposes models of the
individual stars and planets used in the calibrating observations. (664)
In addition, the features of the modeled system may have to be processed further so as to
speak to higher-level theories.
The records of the data as transformed by the sequence of data processing steps—as well
as the original records of data collection—are all what I will call “empirical results”. The
3Partial list from Neilsen’s Notes on the Essentials of Astronomy Data: http://home.fnal.gov/
~neilsen/notebook/astroImagingDataReduction/astroImagingDataReduction.html
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collection of empirical results for a given sequence of data collection and processing stages
is what I will call a “line of evidence”.
Not all empirical results are useful as constraints on theory. To be useful as a constraint
on theory, an empirical result must be well-adapted to that theory. To see when a result is
well-adapted to a theory it is helpful to consider what could make it mal-adapted. First of all,
it is clear that results presupposing concepts, parameters, or other such vehicles that are not
found in the theory to be constrained will be mal-adapted to that theory. Consider ancient
Chinese records of astronomical events. These observations were recorded using categories
quite different than those of contemporary theorizing. The records refer to k’o-hsing (“guest
stars” or “visiting stars”), po-hsing (“rayed stars” or “bushy stars”), and hui-hsing (“broom
stars” or “sweeping stars”) not, say, “comets” and “supernovae” (cf. Clark and Stephenson,
1977, 40). Contemporary astronomers want to use the content of these records as constraints
on their own theoretical frameworks. However, the conceptual vocabulary in which the
records are expressed cross-cuts the concepts available in the contemporary framework—the
ancient observations are, taken at face-value, mal-adapted to the contemporary epistemic
context in which the constraint is to occur. Therefore, if constraints on contemporary theories
are to be generated from the ancient results, some work will have to be done to connect those
results up to the theories of interest. New and different well-adapted results will have to be
generated from the ancient ones.
Another initially plausible thought is that a result is mal-adapted to the theory to be
constrained when presuppositions derived from a genuine competitor theory are incorporated
in the data processing that generates that result. But this is not quite right—incorporating
presuppositions from a genuine competitor need not generate a mal-adapted result.
Laymon (1988) discusses just such a case in the context of the Michelson-Morley exper-
iment looking for an effect of aether velocity on the speed of light. According to Laymon,
Michelson modeled his experimental apparatus using simple single-ray optics that made
assumptions formally inconsistent with the theory to be constrained. However, using the
consistent assumptions would have resulted in a fourth-order correction in the context of
an experiment that was only sensitive to second-order effects, and thus did not make a
significant difference (Laymon, 1988, 258).
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In light of this we will say that in order to constrain some theory, an empirical result must
be “well-adapted” (meaning well-adapted to the context of constraint), and that an empirical
result is well-adapted when all of the presuppositions that have been incorporated into it
throughout the course of data collection and processing are either formally compatible with
the theory to be constrained or else their incorporation does not make a relevant difference
to the constraint. Here, “not making a relevant difference” means that if the incompatible
presuppositions were replaced by compatible ones, the judgment of the consistency of the
theory with the resulting constraint would not be affected.4 That is, the incorporation of the
incompatible presuppositions does not influence the constraint thereby obtained in a manner
that differs significantly from the influence that formally compatible assumptions would have
imparted, had they been incorporated instead. Here I use the phrase “formal compatibility”
to refer to formal consistency and the sharing of a common conceptual framework, and
“context of constraint” to encompass both the theory at hand as well as the norms of
constraint belonging to the discipline in question (e.g. conventional standards of statistical
significance).
With these preliminaries in hand, let us return to our central question: with respect to
what exactly are our theories supposed to be consistent?
Empirical results are not good candidates for explicating the “tribunal of experience”
because the evidential corpus composed of empirical results is inconsistent and it would
be a fool’s errand to require our theories to be consistent with something that itself lacks
consistency. Time and time again it looks like science produces result R and then promptly
not-R. Franklin (2002) captures this idea succinctly: “it is a fact of life in empirical science
that experiments often give discordant results” (35). Discord is particularly easy to see in
the case of empirically derived parameter values. Consider for instance the value of H0,
the Hubble parameter today, the current rate of expansion of the universe. Edwin Hubble’s
original value derived from observations of Cepheid variable stars in the early twentieth
century was a rough 500 km/s/Mpc, whereas the latest value derived using data from the
Planck cosmic microwave background satellite is 67.8± 0.9 in the same units (Hubble, 1929;
4See Miller (2016) for a discussion of when theoretical and measurement uncertainties make a difference
for empirical adequacy.
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Planck Collaboration, 2016a). These values manifestly disagree. If evidence is discordant it
is not cumulative and it cannot be amalgamated and deployed in joint constraints. Neither
are lines of evidence good candidates for explicating the “tribunal of experience” since lines
of evidence are just collections of empirical results.
In addition to lines of evidence, we need to include metadata in our conception of the
evidence with respect to which empirical adequacy is to be adjudicated. Each empirical result
produced in the course of data collection and processing has associated metadata.5 Let us
consider two types: “provenance” metadata (associated with the data collection stage of
research) and “workflow” metadata (associated with the data processing stage of research).
In the sense intended here, metadata is auxillary information about empirical results. For
example, in the case of volcanology where data include rock samples, provenance metadata
include identifiers signifying the field campaign and the researcher who collected the sample,
GIS coordinates of the sample collection site, date and time of collection, description of
surrounding environment and weather conditions, description of the specimen condition at
the time of collection, and narrative field notes that record anomalous conditions and other
details deemed relevant (Palmer et al., 2011, 7-8).
Workflow metadata might include (in the case of potassium-argon dating for instance)
details about the atomic absorption spectrophotometer used to date the rock samples (in-
cluding a description of the apparatus and procedure used), corrections for atmospheric con-
tamination, background information on radioactive isotopes including isotopic abundances
and decay series, formula for calculating time since the rock cooled from quantities of iso-
topes in the sample, and a variety of assumptions including lack of contamination from
non-radiogenic 40Ar (cf. McDougall and Harrison, 1999).6
I will refer to lines of evidence considered together with their associated metadata as
“enriched lines of evidence”. One can discern enriched lines of evidence in fields from cli-
5See Leonelli (2014) for a discussion of the importance of metadata for assessing the epistemic relevance
of biological data shared in online databases.
6Leonelli (2009) characterizes metadata for biological data shared in databases as “including ‘evidence
codes’ classifying each data set according to the method and protocol through which it was obtained, the
model organism and instruments used in the experiment, the publications or repository in which it first
appeared, and the contact details of the researchers responsible, who can therefore be contacted directly for
any question not answered in the database” (741).
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mate science to molecular biology to particle physics.7 The data management strategies and
techniques will of course vary from field to field, but the broad-brush elements are shared
across the sciences. One can think of an enriched line of evidence in analogy with Railton’s
notion of an ideal explanatory text.8 Railton (1981) suggests that acceptable explanations,
which genuinely convey explanatory information, need not be maximally specific. An infor-
mative answer to the question “Why is this one lobster blue?” need not invoke all details of
evolutionary theory and particular conditions associated with the individual, but could be
simply: “It’s a random mutation, very rare” (ibid., 239). Similarly, although all of the pre-
suppositions that contribute to the generation of an empirical constraint are implicated in the
epistemic relevance and adaptedness of that constraint to theoretical contexts, in practice the
entire enriched line of evidence need not be hauled out for appraisal every time. For instance,
researchers may have good reasons to believe that the instrument used to collect data was
well-calibrated without checking all the available information relevant to that calibration.
However, reason to be suspicious of the instrument’s calibration could always arise later on,
and revisiting the information available about the calibration could become epistemically
imperative. We can often take things for granted. Until we can’t.
Thus one can think of enriched lines of evidence as including the rich (perhaps bottomless)
reservoirs of background information implicated in the production of an empirical constraint.
Different circumstances will call for interrogating this reservoir to various extents.
Before I go on to discuss some benefits of adopting an enriched view of evidence in the
next section, allow me to briefly comment on the relation of this view to the work that Sabina
Leonelli has done on data, database curation, and traveling facts (cf. Leonelli, 2009, 2013,
2015, 2016).9 I am broadly sympathetic to the approach that Leonelli takes. In particular,
I share her interest in understanding how it is that the products of empirical science are
in fact fruitfully and responsibly shared across epistemic contexts—how such products are
re-used and re-purposed. Indeed, I think that focusing on understanding such successful
7cf. http://lhcb-elec.web.cern.ch/lhcb-elec/html/architecture.htm for a description of the
front-end electronics implemented in the LHCb experiment. Jenni et al. (2003) is the full technical report
on the ATLAS trigger and data acquisition system. See e.g. Perovic (2017) for a philosophically-informed
discussion of calibration at the LHC, especially sections 3-5.
8Chris Smeenk and Porter Williams independently suggested this analogy to me.
9See also: Howlett and Morgan (2010).
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transfer across contexts gets at issues of interest to many philosophers of science, for instance
those interested in epistemic progress and theory change after ?, generalization, replication,
triangulation, ecological validity, and other such epistemic issues in the epistemology of
experiment.10
An important aspect of Leonelli’s account of how biological data travel to different epis-
temic contexts involves two moves: decontextualization and recontextualization (cf. Leonelli,
2016, section 1.2.3). According to Leonelli, in the decontextualizing move, data “are at least
temporarily decoupled from information about the local features of their production” (ibid.,
30). In Leonelli (2009), she discusses this move as the “liberation” of data from the details
of their provenance (746). In particular, she argues:
Data that travel through databases become nonlocal. They travel in a package that includes
information about their provenance, but they can be consulted independently of that infor-
mation. This is a way to ‘free’ data from their context and transform them into nonlocal
entities since the separation of data from information about their provenance allows re-
searchers to judge their potential relevance to their research. This is different from judging
the reliability of data within a new research context. This second type of judgment requires
researchers from the new context to access information about how data were originally pro-
duced and match it up with their own (local) criteria for what counts as reliable evidence,
as based on the expertise that they have acquired through their professional experience
in the lab. What counts as reliable evidence depends on scientists’ familiarity with and
opinion of specific materials (e.g., the model organism used), instruments, experimental
protocols, modeling techniques, and even the claims about phenomena that the evidence
is produced to support. Thus, data judged to be reliable become local once again: what
changes is the research context that appropriates them. (747-48)
I take it that the picture is something like this: potential data users can reasonably window
shop curated databases without having all of the details of the provenance of the data
encoded there ready at hand, but when those users want to get down to the business of
actually repurposing some data in a new context, the background providence information
(and new information associated with the new context) must be involved. This picture
is consistent with the enriched view of evidence I have articulated. As I stated above, in
practice the entire enriched line of evidence need not be hauled out for appraisal in every
circumstance.
10Two notable examples are David Colac¸o’s dissertation An Investigation of Scientific Phenomena, which
engages with these topics in the context of biology, pscychology, and neuroscience and Dana Matthiessen’s
manuscript “The Role of Local Knowledge in Mobilizing Data”, which discusses how theoretical and practical
knowledge support repurposing data accross diverse epistemic contexts.
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If this is the right way to understand Leonelli’s position, then I would submit that it is
misleading to speak of “decontextualization” and “liberation” as she does. The epistemic
utility of empirical results depends crucially on the details of their provenance. Epistemi-
cally responsible use of empirical results (such as data) depends on access to its associated
metadata—data can never be permanently decoupled from its associated enriching informa-
tion and retain epistemic utility. Epistemically useful data are never fully liberated of the
details of their provenance, their utility derives from their enrichment by such details.
3.3 BENEFITS OF ENRICHED EVIDENCE
Let us take stock. Enriched evidence in the sense articulated in the previous section is an
account of what our theories of the natural world are supposed to be consistent with that
accommodates sophisticated contemporary scientific research, theory-informed practice and
all. Moreover, it does so in a manner consonant with empiricist scruples, that is, without
invoking ‘good sense’ or extra-empirical virtues like conservatism or simplicity a` la Duhem
and Quine. In the remainder of this paper, I want to draw out what I think are three
major benefits that adopting the enriched view of evidence affords, namely, adopting this
view helps to make sense of how evidence accumulates across theory change, how different
evidence can be amalgamated and used jointly, and how the same evidence can be used to
constrain competing theories in the service of breaking local underdetermination.
Accumulation Empirical results are bound to be lost in the transition out of their
native epistemic contexts when they are mal-adapted to the receiving context. However, it
may be possible to salvage a constraint in the new context, as long as enough information is
available about how the result in question was generated to backtrack through the stages of
data processing in order to find a product of an earlier stage that is adaptable to the theory
to be constrained and re-process using its own resources thereby generating a well-adapted
result. In this way, enriched lines of evidence provide the resources with which a particular
empirical result can be brought to bear on frameworks besides those originally used the
generation of that result.
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Recall the ancient Chinese astronomical observation records, expressed in categories,
k’o-hsing, po-hsing, and hui-hsing, which cross-cut contemporary ones, “comets” and “su-
pernovae”. Of astronomical events recorded using these historical terms, contemporary as-
tronomers would like to know which, if any, are relevant to supernovae. The hui-hsing are the
easiest to rule out—they are described as a star with a definite tail, and we would categorize
them as comets today. In contrast, po-hsing “is the standard term to describe an apparently
tail-less comet” (cf. Clark and Stephenson, 1977, 40). However, there is the possibility of
mistakenly translating an observation of a po-hsing as an observation of a comet, when it is
fact a record of a nova. There are some records of motionless po-hsing, and a motionless new
star without a tail could have been a nova. Regardless, when the duration of the visibility
of these new stars were recorded, they are too short to be supernovae—so po-hsing can also
be ruled out. For instance, translating ko-hsing observations is not always straightforward.
Clark and Stephenson offer the following:
Ko-hsing (which will be subsequently abbreviated to ko) seems to have been the general
term to describe a new star-like object. The well known new stars of AD 1006, 1054, 1572,
and 1604 were identified in this way and we might thus expect ko to be synonymous with
novae and supernovae. On the other hand, there are frequent references to moving ko
throughout oriental history (more than 20 are catalogued by Ho Peng Yoke, 1962), so that
usage of the term must be treated with caution. The nucleus of a comet resembles a star,
so that if no tail is evident confusion seems possible (ibid., 40).
Astronomers mining these historical records need to be wary of the possibility of comets
interloping as novae and supernovae.
Nevertheless, with enough enriching information it can be possible to generate constraints
on contemporary theorizing using these historical records. Quantitative modeling of the
evolution of supernovae and their remnants depends on precise dating of stages of the process.
To take just one example, careful historical work on Chinese records of the supernova of July
4, 1054 have allowed researchers to precisely date the end of the visibility of the event. In
particular, by carefully interpreting a Chinese observation record, Green (2015) extracts the
date of April 6, 1056 (97).11
Will it always be possible to adapt initially mal-adapted results to the context of interest?
Unfortunately not. Consider a data record that is mal-adapted to some epistemic context.
11For further success stories see Clark and Stephenson (1977); Stephenson and Green (2002).
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One can come to know that the record is mal-adapted in the first place by having access to
the associated provenance metadata that includes information about in what way the record
is mal-adapted. This very information would tell us that it will be impossible in practice
to generate a useful constraint on theory from that data. In a sense this means that the
evidence associated with that data must be lost in the transition between epistemic contexts
under consideration.
This loss is not as epistemically problematic as the loss of empirical results more generally.
If as a part of our philosophy of science we characterize evidence as detached empirical
results or as un-enriched lines of evidence, then evidence appears to be lost all over the
place. However, construing empirical science as replete with such loss is both descriptively
inadequate with respect to actual scientific practice and ill-advised epistemically. With
so much evidence “lost”, the cheapness of empirical adequacy would look dangerously like
cherry-picking. Yet, as I have noted above, scientists do manage to re-purpose results across
epistemic contexts and it is desirable to do so when possible because this generates more
empirical constraints. However, if some constraints that we would like to have as a matter of
fact cannot be generated, there is little to be done except move on to generating constraints
in another way. So it goes.
Furthermore, with the resources of an enriched view of evidence we can account for
how it is that empirical adequacy is supposed to be adjudicated with respect to a corpus
of evidence that contains discordant empirical results. If pieces of empirical evidence really
were discordant with one another then evidence again would not be cumulative. However,
the collection of empirical results considered together with auxiliary information about how
they were generated is not internally inconsistent, just as there is no contradiction between
“If x then p” and “If y then not p” even though there is one between “p” and “not p”.
Thus, returning to the example of the discordant values of the Hubble parameter, Hubble’s
estimated value of a rough 500 km/s/Mpc conditioned on the presuppositions with which it
was generated should not be inconsistent with the Planck satellite value of 66.93 ± 0.062
conditioned on the presuppositions with which it was generated.
To see more concretely how the enriched view of evidence helps to make sense of how
evidence can accumulate across epistemic contexts, let us briefly consider an example from
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the history of particle physics from Franklin (2015) (and discussed by Galison (1987))—the
experiment that eventually discovered the existence of weak neutral currents:
When the experiment was initailly conceived, it was a rule of thumb in particle physics
that weak neutral currents did not exist. The initial design included a muon trigger, which
would be present only in charged current interactions. In a charged-current event a neutrino
is incident and a charged muon is emitted, in a neutral-current event there is a neutrino in
both the initial and final states, and no muon is emitted. Thus, requiring a muon in the
event trigger would preclude the observation of neutral currents. (159)
In other words, the original experimental design would have essentially filtered for interac-
tions that produce muons, and thus filtered out the weak neutral currents that the Weinberg-
Salam electroweak theory posited. Fortunately, as Franklin explains, the experimentalists
realized this problem in time and changed the experimental design. But suppose the orig-
inal experimental design had been retained. Any viable theory would still have had to
be consistent with the empirical evidence that would have thereby been produced. That
is, any empirically viable theory would have had to be consistent with the results of the
counterfactual experiment considered together with the presuppositions that went into their
generation. If results consistent with no neutral currents had been produced from the origi-
nal experimental design, such results would have still been consistent with the existence of
neutral currents since the experiment was organized in such a way that regardless of whether
neutral currents existed or not the experiment would not have been sensitive to them on ac-
count of the muon trigger. So it is not the case that the prediction of neutral currents derived
from the Weinberg-Salam theory would have been inconsistent with the enriched evidence
produced in the counterfactual experiment. In fact, had the experiment been performed as
originally intended, ill-advised muon trigger and all, the enriched evidence thereby produced
would still belong in the cumulative evidential corpus. Indeed, the enriched evidence asso-
ciated with this experiment would have been something that any theory—theories positing
weak neutral currents and those omitting them—would have to be consistent with to be
empirically viable, i.e. viable at all for an empiricist.
Amalgamation That the epistemic utility of empirical results depends on the presuppo-
sitions incorporated into those results throughout data collection and data processing might
cause one to worry about the feasibility of combining evidence in an epistemically responsi-
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ble way. An enriched view of evidence also helps to make sense of how evidence produced
using significantly different instruments and techniques might be fruitfully combined. In
fact, there is a danger that if enriching information is not taken into account, that results
used in joint constraints could interact in epistemically problematic ways.
Consider the multi-probe approach to constraining theorizing about dark energy in con-
temporary cosmology. “Dark energy” is a placeholder for whatever is responsible for the
accelerated expansion of the universe, inferred from telescopic observations of distant super-
novae. Very little is presently known about the nature of dark energy. Indeed, cutting-edge
research is largely concerned with trying to discern whether dark energy behaves as a cos-
mological constant or if its contribution to the energy density budget of the universe evolves
over cosmic time. To tackle this question, cosmologists are combining different datasets
gathered in a variety of ways. For instance, the approach taken in the Dark Energy Survey
(DES) combines cosmic shear, galaxy-galaxy lensing, galaxy clustering, Baryon Acoustic
Oscillations, galaxy cluster number counts, and Type Ia supernova (Krause et al., 2017).
However, as the DES cosmologists are aware, it is not always appropriate to simply calculate
the constraints on the theoretical parameters of interest for each probe in parallel and then
combine the constraints thereby derived afterwards. Care must be taken in combining the
different galaxy survey probes, because they “are highly correlated with each other in that
they are tracers of the same underlying density field, and in that they share common sys-
tematic effects” (ibid., 3). Effectively combining results from these different probes requires
paying attention to the details that have gone into analyzing them. Without conscientious
treatment of how the systematic errors associated with each probe interact, the joint con-
straints could be constructed in a way that obscured the shared systematics and thereby
delivered the wrong pronouncement on the parameters given the empirical results.
In other words, combining results from DES probes in a responsible way requires know-
ing what presuppositions have gone into those results. Note though, that knowing what
presuppositions have gone into the results would be required even if the results were suitably
independent from one another such that they could be straightforwardly combined after par-
allel processing. Knowing that results can be straightforwardly combined requires knowing
that nothing has been baked into those results during analysis that will cause problems in
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the epistemic context of interest. This is true not just of the results from DES probes but
of results generally. Whether and how results can be combined and used in joint constraints
depends on the presuppositions those results have incorporated.
Breaking underdetermination Temporary underdetermination is a ubiquitous feature
of scientific research. There are often multiple empirically viable theories (or models, or
hypotheses) of some target. In addition, scientists often want the same empirical evidence
to constrain multiple alternatives. For instance, the same observational evidence used to
constrain competing theories of dark matter, including theories that cast the ontology of dark
matter in radically different terms—as a particle/substance or as a feature of gravitation.
Given that empirical results are often heavily processed, and often involve presupposing
resources from the very theory that they are generated to constrain, how is it that the same
evidence could be used to constrain alternative theories? On the enriched view of evidence,
the answer is clear: with the help of enriching information, elements of a line of evidence
can be repurposed to many contexts of constraint. For instance, the same galaxy rotation
curve data can be processed in multiple ways to constrain parameters relevant to different
proposals for dark matter particles and to different gravitational theories.
The availability of this answer is a benefit that the enriched view has over the view that
van Fraassen articulates in his 2008 book Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspec-
tive. There, van Fraassen makes a significant step forward in reconciling the conception of
evidence with the minimal commitment of empiricism. He countenances checking for the
empirical adequacy of theories as an attempt to match the structures of theoretical models
and smoothed out data models. His insight is that the epistemic significance of this match-
ing relies upon the relevance of the data model to the theory, and that such relevance is
appreciated only by contextualizing the data model:
A particular data model is relevant because it was constructed on the basis of results
gathered in a certain way, selected by specific criteria of relevance, on certain occasions, in
a practical experimental or observational setting, designed for that purpose. (253)
Adjudicating the empirical adequacy of a theory requires identifying results relevant to that
theory. But as van Fraassen rightly recognizes (and as I have argued above), auxiliary in-
formation about the particularities of data collection, processing and analysis are crucial for
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discerning the relevance of a data model to any theory. van Fraassen’s insight brings into
focus the futility of considering bare results in absence of auxiliary information about their
manner of production as empirical evidence at all. Having access to the auxiliary informa-
tion is critical for (merely) judging the relevance of empirical results. Without auxiliary
information, results (such as 125 GeV or 13.8 billion years, a plot, a photograph, etc.) are
just free-floating.
Although contextualizing results in the manner that van Fraassen suggests is an impor-
tant step, he does not fully exploit the consequences of this move. I suspect that the reason
for this is that empirical adequacy is not the primary problem with which he engages in
his 2008 work. Instead, van Fraassen’s insight leads him to a solution of what he calls the
Loss of Reality Objection (cf. 258). According to van Fraassen, the objection is a sort of
puzzle for any empiricist account of science, namely, how can it be that our theories are
constrained by the way that the natural world is, when empirical adequacy is adjudicated
by matching models of theory to data models rather than to nature itself? His own answer
rests heavily on including representation users in our understanding of representations. In-
stead of casting representation as a two-place relation (between e.g., a data model and some
phenomenon), van Fraassen understands representation as three-place: “Nothing represents
anything except in the sense of being used or taken to do that job or play that role for us”
(ibid.).
van Fraassen illustrates this point with an illuminating imagined conversation between
a scientist and a metaphysician (254-57). The scientist presents a graph S representing
the deer population growth in Princeton, which fits with a model of some theory T. The
metaphysician serves as the voice of the Loss of Reality Objection wondering whether T
fits the actual deer population in Princeton. van Fraassen’s scientist responds, “Since this
is my representation of the deer population growth, there is for me no difference between
the question whether T fits the graph and the question whether T fits the deer population
growth” (256). van Fraassen likens this situation to the “pragmatic tautology” (aka T-
schema) “The sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white” (fn 26). For van
Fraassen, the requisite link between a data model and reality crucially involves locating the
representation user, as in: a theory is empirical adequate to the phenomenon as represented
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by us (cf. 259). Moreover, the pragmatic tautology is supposed to quell the worry that all
we can ever say is that theories are empirically adequate with respect to the natural world
under some description (which is, after all, not the natural world itself), by collapsing the
deer population growth as represented in S and the deer population (for us). This collapse
is supposed to be facilitated by the role of the representation user.
However, I think van Fraassen mis-emphasizes what it is that makes results relevant and
that consequently his view is unnecessarily restricted. van Fraassen’s view does not highlight
the ways in which data collected in one context can be relevant in another. I agree with him
that a data model is relevant to constraining a particular theory in virtue of the manner in
which it was constructed—that is, the manner of data collection, processing, and analysis.
However, insofar as these details can be made public, the data model is not relevant to the
theory in question merely for me, but also for others who have access to that information. By
sharing the information about how data has been gathered and processed, many scientists
can assess the relevance of empirical results with respect to theories. Moreover, access to
auxiliary information about data collection, processing, and analysis not only allows many
agents to appreciate the relevance of data models so produced to the theory or theories for
which the data was originally designed to test, but also in some cases to appreciate the
relevance of the data to other theories beyond those targeted by the scientists who designed
the observations and/or experiments in which the data were collected.
I suspect that van Fraassen would not be hostile to these points. And to be fair, my
criticism of his account relies on a fairly strict reading of the passage quoted above (specifi-
cally of the phrase “for that purpose”). Nevertheless, it is the case that a data model can be
relevant for adjudicating the empirical adequacy of a theory despite the fact that the model
was originally constructed for a different purpose. In particular, once results are considered
together with the auxiliary information about the manner of their production, it becomes
possible to see how mal-adapted results could be reworked so as to become well-adapted.
With information about how a result was produced, one can sometimes backtrack through
processing stages until one arrives at a result adaptable to one’s purpose.
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3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
I have argued that the characterization of evidence relevant to the adjudication of empirical
adequacy is enriched evidence. Empirical adequacy is to be adjudicated with respect to all
available data records and the empirical results generated from them considered together will
all the available information about how the data was collected and processed. The notion of
enriched evidence provides the resources to account for how scientists adhere to the minimal
commitment of empiricism by doing due diligence to check the empirical adequacy of their
theories. In other words, taking into account auxiliary information about data generation
processes, it is no longer so mysterious how theories could be expected to be empirically
adequate with respect to initially mal-adapted results and prima facie discordant results,
or how there is a sense in which the same evidence can be used to constrain substantially
different theories despite the intertwining of the theoretical and the empirical in scientific
evidence. In fact, I hope to have shown how it is in fact not despite that intertwining, but
in virtue of it that these important epistemic activities are possible at all.
45
4.0 EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY
The apparent simplicity of characterizing empirical adequacy as ‘saving the phenomena’
belies the contortions required to bring theory and phenomena together and the conditions
under which this is possible at all. I offer a new characterization of empirical adequacy that il-
luminates this fine-grained structure, explore the conditions under which empirical adequacy
in the proposed sense can be adjudicated, and discuss implications for data stewardship. It
seems that scientists rarely have the information that they would need to responsibly adju-
dicate empirical adequacy, but this situation could be dramatically improved with increased
documentation and preservation of empirical results and the processes that generate them.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In 1977 Mike Mandel and Larry Sultan displayed a series of photographs at the San Francisco
Museum of Modern Art, calling the work Evidence. All but one of the pieces had been
gleaned from files at institutions like the Jet Propulsion Laboratories, the General Atomic
Company, and the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center. The photographs were displayed
without identifying text, as a “poetic exploration upon the restructuring of imagery” (quoted
in Phillips, 2003). One depicted figures climbing on a tree surrounded by a translucent box,
backlighting them like Indonesian shadow puppets. In another, a group of men in hardhats
progressively disappear into a field of white foam. What do these photographs depict? Why
were they made? The viewer was left to speculate, conjuring possible narratives for these
uncanny artifacts. Mandel and Sultan had bet the museum’s Curator of Photography John
Humphrey a good bottle of whiskey that he would not be able to pick out an inauthentic
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piece that they included in the show (a photograph of an array of posts on a flat foreground
with hills in the distance) guessing that without identifying information, even a keen eye
could not discern the impostor (ibid.).
Mandel and Sultan’s Evidence vividly shows that record detached from its context is
utterly useless as evidence. Without sufficient metadata records of empirical research can
at best serve as sources of “poetic exploration”. This is precisely the point for which I will
argue in what follows. When scientists want their theories to be empirically adequate, they
must check them against the available evidence. But getting something to serve as evidence
requires substantive information about its provenance.
Despite its crucial role in any empiricist philosophy of science, the notion of empirical
adequacy is murky. An adequate theory is one that ‘saves the phenomena’. But what
precisely does it mean to save the phenomena? And how are scientists themselves to go
about doing this?
In a 2017 paper titled “What’s so special about empirical adequacy?”, Bhakthavatsalam
and Cartwright offer the following:
It is good to start with a definition of “empirical adequacy”, but it turns out to be difficult
to find one in the philosophical literature. We think that what is usually intended is
something like this: a theory (or model or set of scientific claims) is empirically adequate
when the claims it makes about empirical phenomena – or at least the bulk of these claims,
or the central ones – are correct, or approximately correct enough. We shall assume this
usage and leave aside the question of what counts as empirical and what as theoretical (2,
footnote omitted)
Boiling this definition down somewhat, Bhakthavatsalam and Cartwright are suggesting that
theories are empirically adequate when the claims they make about empirical phenomena
are correct. This characterization leaves room for much more to be said about “empiri-
cal phenomena” and how these are to be compared to claims that theories make. Many
phenomena of interest to scientists are not studied directly but rather via sophisticated ap-
plication of instrumentation and techniques that elicit data from which empirical results
can be derived. In such cases, the propositions derived from the theory side are compared
to the empirical results. It would be desirable to have a more precise characterization of
empirical adequacy than that offered by Bhakthavatsalam and Cartwright (2017) in order
to see in more fine-grained detail how the empirical content of theories runs up against the
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world–what is compared to what, and what conditions are required for that comparison?
The present chapter aims at two advances. The first is to give a specific characterization
of empirical adequacy. The characterization I offer has the advantage that it makes trans-
parent the sense in which the epistemic utility of empirical results as constraints on theories
is dependent on the manner in which those results were generated and the presuppositions
that have been incorporated into them along the way. In other words, the epistemic utility
of empirical results depends crucially on the details of their provenance. The second is to
show how once we conceive of empirical adequacy in this way, then the importance of good
data stewardship becomes obvious and pressing in a way that it might not otherwise have
been.
Suppose, as I have argued in Chapter 3, that we conceive of the evidence with respect
to which empirical adequacy is to be adjudicated to be the evidential corpus consisting
of all available enriched lines of evidence. Consider a single enriched line of evidence in
the evidential corpus, which traces from records of data collection through a variety of
intermediary empirical results to terminate in an empirical constraint on some theory and all
of the enriching information associated with that line of evidence (provenance and workflow
metadata). What would it take for a theory to be consistent with this enriched line of
evidence? If the empirical constraint at the end of the line of evidence were well-adapted to
the theory to be constrained, then to be consistent with that enriched line of evidence the
theory need simply be consistent with the constraint at its terminus.
However, if the empirical constraint is not well-adapted to the theory to be constrained,
then it could still be possible for that theory to be consistent with the enriched line of
evidence that produced the mal-adapted constraint. In particular, this will be the case if
there is some other intermediary result upstream in the line of evidence that produced the
constraint that is adaptable to that theory. In that case, to demonstrate the consistency
of the theory with the enriched line of evidence a second line of evidence will have to be
generated stemming from the adaptable upstream result. The empirical constraint at the
end of the new line should then be well-adapted to the theory to be constrained. If the
theory is consistent with this new constraint, then (I suggest) it is empirically adequate with
respect to the evidence at hand. Note that the same possibilities apply if we consider any
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empirical result, for instance and intermediary one, instead of the one at the end of a line.
With respect to a given theory, any empirical result will either be well-adapted to it or not.
If it is not well-adapted, then demonstrating adequacy will require identifying some other
result upstream from it that is adaptable.
If we allow the term “accommodate” to stand in for these two ways in which a theory
can be adequate with respect to an enriched line of evidence, then we can define empirical
adequacy compactly as follows:
Empirical Adequacy A theory is empirically adequate when it can accommodate every
available enriched line of evidence in the evidential corpus.
In other words, a theory is empirically adequate when for every result in the evidential
corpus, the line of evidence that produced that result shares an empirical result with some
line of evidence, the final result of which is both well-adapted to and consistent with that
theory.
The definition of empirical adequacy given above relies on the notions of the evidential
corpus, lines of evidence, and the well-adaptedness of results, which I have already explicated
in Chapter 3. In light of this, I will take the first two of these notions on board without
further comment, and although I will recapitulate discussion of the third notion, I will
focus on specifying the conditions under which adequacy can be adjudicated (Section 4.2)
and showing how the above characterization is reflected in scientific practice (Section 4.3).
Finally, Section 4.4 discusses consequences of the foregoing for the documentation of evidence
and the stewardship of data and its metadata.
4.2 ADJUDICATING EMPIRICAL ADEQUACY
How exactly is the empirical adequacy of a theory checked with respect to some evidence?
And what are the conditions required for that checking? To begin with, being able to judge
whether a result falls within the scope of a theory is a necessary condition for being able to
use that result as constraint on that theory in an epistemically responsible way. Whether
a result falls within the scope of a theory depends crucially on the provenance of the data
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from which it derives. Without metadata on data collection, one cannot judge on which
theories empirical results derived from that data bear. Such results are like Mandel and
Sultan’s Evidence–destined to be sources of “poetic exploration” not empirical constraints
on theorizing.
Obviously some record, either the original data records or some subsequent records
of processed data, are necessary for being able to derive an empirical constraint. If the
constraint is to be derived from subsequent records of processed data (i.e. intermediary
empirical results), then metadata on that processing is also necessary for being able to
generate a constraint. To use an empirical result responsibly, one needs to know whether
presuppositions have been incorporated into that result in the course of processing that will
cause trouble for the constraint one would like to generate down the line. In particular, one
wants to know that the result is well-adapted or adaptable to the theory one would like to
constrain.
We will say that a data product is well-adapted when all of the presuppositions that have
been incorporated into it throughout the course of data collection and processing are either
formally compatible with the theory to be constrained or else their incorporation does not
make a relevant difference to the constraint. Here, “not making a relevant difference” means
that if the incompatible presuppositions were replaced by compatible ones, the judgment of
the consistency of the theory with the resulting constraint would not be affected. That is, the
incorporation of the incompatible presuppositions does not influence the constraint thereby
obtained in a manner that differs significantly from the influence that formally compatible
assumptions would have imparted, had they been incorporated instead. We will say that
an empirical result is adaptable when it can be further processed in order to generate a
well-adapted constraint.
There are two main strategies for successful adjudication of empirical adequacy:
Conditions Requisite for Adjudicating Empirical Adequacy Where sufficient meta-
data is available, the adequacy of a theory with respect to some result may be adjudicated
only if it is possible to either
1. (forward direction) use an extant empirical result, by either (i) using the original
data records to generate an empirical constraint via data processing, (ii) using an
extant intermediary result to generate an empirical constraint via data processing, or
(iii) using an existing well-adapted empirical constraint, or
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2. (reverse direction) use workflow metadata to undo incompatible data processing to
reconstruct an adaptable empirical result and then generate a well-adapted empirical
constraint from it via new data processing.
In other words, the resources that one needs in order to adjudicate the adequacy of
a theory with respect to some evidence depends on empirical results available. In any
case one needs provenance metadata for the records of data collection. Some cases will
additionally require metadata regarding the subsequent data processing workflow, and some
will require undoing the processing initially done. Such resources are of course not sufficient
for adjudicating the adequacy of a theory–one needs much else besides. For instance, one
certainly needs a theory to be adjudicated in the first place, one needs to be able to derive
from that theory something that can be checked against the constraint produced at the end of
the line of evidence, and one needs standards of constraint. There is much more to say about
these further conditions that is beyond the scope of the present task. However, I can provide
somewhat more in the way of support for the characterization of empirical adequacy just
articulated by exhibiting cases where the importance of metadata for adjudicating adequacy
is clear.
Option 1.iii above is in some sense the easiest route to adjudicating adequacy. If one is
already in possession of a well-adapted result, then no further data processing is required to
generate a useful constraint on theory. In another sense this route is quite onerous. Having
good reasons to think that one is in possession of a well-adapted result requires knowing a
lot about both the provenance of the data from which that result derives and its subsequent
processing. In comparison, starting with original data records (option 1.i) will often require
further processing to be carried out, however less metadata need be known at the outset.
Since one is considering data records before subsequent processing, metadata regarding such
processing is obviously not relevant. Once further processing has been carried out, the
metadata associated with it will be relevant to the epistemic utility of the result thereby
generated but the researcher(s) doing the processing could plan to document that metadata
as they work.
The variety of strategies enumerated above furnish hints about what kind of resources
are needed for adjudicating empirical adequacy. With the exception of 1.iii, the case in which
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one already has a well-adapted empirical constraint, these strategies are heuristics for how
to salvage empirical constraints from evidence that would otherwise be inapplicable to the
theory whose adequacy one would like to adjudicate. As I will demonstrate in the following
section, these other strategies show how the adequacy of theories can be adjudicated with
respect to evidence originally produced in significantly different epistemic contexts—if the
right resources are available. The viability of salvaging evidence across epistemic contexts is
something that should be of significant interest to philosophers of science since it serves as
a mechanism for maintaining the continuity of empirical evidence over the history of science
and across competing theoretical frameworks.
4.3 SALVAGING EVIDENCE
Demonstrating the adequacy of a theory with respect to some evidence often involves re-
interpreting the the empirical result originally produced. Such re-interpretation sometimes
significantly changes the epistemic significance of the evidence in question. Researchers
at an Australian telescope picked up novel signals, initially thought to be extragalactic
in origin, and dubbed them “perytons” after one of Borges’ monsters. The signals were
eventually tracked back to occasions on which the door to the observatory microwave oven
was prematurely opened (Burke-Spolaor et al., 2011; Petroff et al., 2015). Allan Franklin has
extensively treated the case of the “disappearing” 17-keV neutrino, which turned out to have
been an apparition caused by the narrow energy window used in data analysis (Franklin,
1995, 2002). The discovery of superluminal neutrinos by the OPERA collaboration was later
retracted, the signal being explained as resulting from a poor fiber optic cable connection
(Reich, Eugenie Samuel, 2012).
If it is possible to accommodate evidence by re-interpretation it is epistemically better to
do so than to abandon that evidence. The reason is that evidence that is not accommodated
stands as a prima facie anomaly, threatening the empirical adequacy of the theory in question.
I discuss two cases wherein evidence is salvaged so as to facilitate accommodation with
respect to contemporary theorizing. These cases show the nature and extent of resources
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that can be needed to salvage evidence.
4.3.1 Forward direction
Use data records and their provenance metadata (1.i) The first case is one in which
scientists generate a constraint from old records of data collection by utilizing enough meta-
data regarding the provenance of those records.
Days on Earth are getting longer. That is, the length of the average solar day is gradually
elongating as the rotation of the Earth gently slows by losing angular momentum to the
Moon through the tides.1 There are two timescales at play here: universal time (UT), which
measures the (variable) length of the average solar day, and terrestrial time (TT), which is
a uniform timescale determinable by atomic clocks. Recent calculations of the change in the
length of the day suggest that the mechanism of tidal-breaking is not enough to account
for Earth’s slowing spin. Other factors such as the coupling between the Earth’s core and
mantel and changes in the shape of the Earth after the retreat of the glaciers could account
for the difference. Thus, careful determination of the changes in the length of the day over
long timescales can yield constraints on geophysical modeling Stephenson et al. (2016a, 24).
To calculate changes in the length of the day one can attempt to use historical observa-
tions of astronomical events such as eclipses. This is no easy task since such observations
(from ancient and medieval Babylon, China, Europe and Asia) must be carefully translated
and interpreted. In order to be useful for this purpose, a historical observation must meet
certain requirements (following Stephenson and Morrison, 1995, 171):
1. it must be possible to determine the geographical location from which the observation
was made
2. the observation must be of an event in the solar system so that it is possible to calculate
the timing of the event in TT from the applicable dynamical equations
3. it must be possible to determine the exact date of the observed event
4. it must be possible to determine the UT of the event2
1Changes in the average length of the solar day are not due to the usual seasonal variation accounted for
by the tilt of the Earth’s axis, but are rather the remaining changes when the seasonal variation has already
been accounted for.
2For exceptions see Stephenson and Morrison (1995, 171)
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Extracting eclipse observations from Babylonian records for instance requires deciphering
cuneiform script on broken (and rare) clay tablets and then translating the inscriptions to
extract the desired timing information. Figure 2 depicts and example of a Babylonian record
of table of lunar eclipses for at least 609-447 BC (number 32234 in the collection of the British
Museum).
Figure 2: Babylonian table of lunar eclipses ©Trustees of the British Museum
For instance, the unit of time used is the us, corresponding to the interval of time in
which the celestial sphere turns through 1 degree (or 4 minutes), which are thought to have
been measured using a clepsydra (water clock) (Stephenson and Morrison, 1995, 174). The
magnitude of an eclipse was given in si (fingers), where 12 fingers spans the diameter of the
disk of eclipsed body (sun or moon). The timing of eclipses were given with reference to
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time since or time to sunrise or sunset.3
There are many interesting challenges in deciphering, interpreting and using Babylonian
eclipse records to constrain our understanding of the evolution of the Earth’s day. For
instance, there are difficulties in determining whether a record is indeed a record of an
eclipse observation or rather if it is a record of a prediction for an eclipse. Purported
observation records may actually be predictions. Contemporary researchers suspect that an
alleged observation of the lunar eclipse of 522 BC is rather best interpreted as a prediction
of the eclipse of 522 BC “made by quoting an actual observation of 54 years earlier” (Huber
and De Meis, 2004, 7).
Moreover, damage to the tablets themselves can “obliterate the distinction between 40
and 50, or between 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8”, thereby frustrating the project of extracting good
timing data from these records (ibid., 8). The particularities of the Babylonian epistemic
context also obviously influence what is recorded on the tablets. For instance, the day began
with sunset for a Babylonian, and the year with the vernal equinox (ibid., 10). Fascinatingly,
the sign for WATER+EYE (meaning “weeping, lamentation”) is to be interpreted as the
time of maximal phase of an eclipse (ibid., 9, see also 14). Huber and De Meis note: “these
texts are written in a peculiar shorthand notation, using a combination of (pseudo-)Sumerian
ideograms and phonetically written Akkadian words. The latter sometimes are abbreviated
to their first syllable. Sumerian and Akkadian lexica offer little help, the meaning of the
texts must be deciphered from the astronomical context” (9).
Consider a further challenge: the sources of error relevant to these data. The accuracy
of the Babylonian timing data is probably not great, perhaps admitting random errors of
about 12 minutes for short time intervals and of about 15 percent of the interval recorded for
large intervals (ibid., 19). In addition to these random errors, there seem to also be sources
3Thus (just to give a flavor of the task at hand) a typical record would be translated as follows:
Year 168 (Arsacid), that is year 232 (Seleucid), Arsaces, king or kings, which is in the time
of king Orodes (I), month I, night of the 13th. . . 5°before µ Her culminated, lunar eclipse,
beginning on the south-east side. In 20°of night it made 6 fingers. 7°of night duration of
maximal phase, until it began to become bright. In 13°from south-east to north-west, 4
fingers lacking to brightness, it set [. . . ] (Began) at 40°before sunrise (see Stephenson and
Morrison, 1995, 175)
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of systematic error in the Babylonian records, which have still not been fully characterized:
First, Babylonian measurements are affected by elusive systematic errors of 2 to 5 percent.
In addition, there are systematic discrepancies between the ancient naked-eye observations
of the eclipse phases and modern calculations geared towards telescopic observations. For
example, observed Babylonian lunar eclipses appear to last about 12 minutes longer than
calculated, while solar eclipses are shorter by about the same amount. Unfortunately, most
Babylonian eclipse timings are relative to the same phase, namely time intervals from sunset
or sunrise to the onset of the eclipse, so systematic effects will enter most time differences
in the same way. Since they are larger than the hoped-for accuracy of the estimate, we
must be extremely careful, lest they vitiate the latter. (19)
Additionally, the observation records do not always explicitly provide all of the details of the
eclipse observation that contemporary researchers need in order to transform it into a useful
constraint on length of day theorizing. When the desired information is not immediately
given in the inscription, it is sometimes possible to recover it by engaging in what we might
call “evidential forensics”. For instance, one can use strategies from historiography and
archeology to try to reconstruct the conditions under which the original observation was
made. Mention of certain kings or cities can provide clues as to the date of an eclipse. So
can more subtle orthographic conventions.
Reasoning through the circumstances of the observation can help too. Stephenson et al.
(2016b) determine a constraint from a Babylonian record for 694 BC that states the Moon
set while eclipsed. They argue:
Assuming an observer at an elevation of 10 to 15 m above the ground (the height of the
walls of Babylon), and horizontal refraction as 34’, the true lunar altitude, corrected for
parallax, would need to be -0.°4 for the whole Moon to be visible (3)
From the inferred timing of the moonset they derive the difference between UT and TT on
that date. The use of the assumed height of the walls of Babylon to make this calculation is
both remarkable and very clever!
The use of Babylonian observation records to constrain geophysical theories regarding
the elongation of the solar day is an example of generating empirical constraints from records
of data collection with the help of sufficient provenance metadata. Once the information re-
garding the location, date, and timing of the eclipse has been extracted from the observation
record, that data can be processed to estimate the difference between UT and TT at that
date. The historical trend of such differences can be compared to that predicted by models
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of mechanisms through which the angular momentum of the turning Earth might plausibly
dissipate. Thus, the use of Babylonian clay tablets as a source for generating useful empirical
constraints on contemporary geophysical theorizing is an example of salvaging evidence from
a distant epistemic context.
Use an extant result and its metadata (1.ii) The second case we will consider
demonstrates how a data product that has already been significantly processed can be ap-
praised for use as an empirical constraint, provided there is enough accessible metatdata
about how the data product was generated.
A fantastic example of this sort of resourceful salvaging of processed data is Astronomy
Rewind.4 Astronomy Rewind is a citizen-science project in which users add key metadata to
otherwise mysterious scientific results by investigating the context in which those results were
published. The publicized goal of the project is to “rescue tens of thousands of potentially
valuable cosmic images that are mostly dead to science and bring them fully back to life”
(American Astronomical Society, 2017). In an online interface, users are shown pictures of
figures extracted from papers printed in astronomy journals like The Astrophysical Journal
before the 1990s when publication went digital. In the first stage of the interface, users are
asked to identify what type of image they are looking at (e.g. diagram or image of the sky).
Further stages aim to extract specific metadata about scale, orientation, position on the sky,
and astronomical bodies pictured from figure labels, surrounding text, and comparison to
other catalogs of astronomical images.
The explicit aim of Astronomy Rewind is to make available the metadata that is needed
in order to use these graphical results that were published in the past:
Modern electronic astronomical images often include information about where they fit on
the sky, along with which telescope and camera were used and many other details. But
such “metadata” are useful to researchers only if the original image files are published along
with the journal articles in which they’re analyzed and interpreted. This isn’t always the
case (ibid.)
Astronomy Rewind is premised on the idea that such metadata can be recovered from careful
scrutiny of the context in which a figure was published on the page, thereby rescuing it for
use as an empirical result relevant for constraining theorizing. This project is very new
4See https://www.zooniverse.org/projects/zooniverse/astronomy-rewind
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and so we will have to wait some time to see the fruits it will bear. However, astronomers
anticipate that the enriched results produced by Astronomy Rewind could include valuable
resources for constraining cosmology (Gibney, 2017). For instance, digging through these
archival results could lead to the identification of more recurrent novae (ibid.). Studying
these objects is presently a matter of intense interest since such research may have important
implications for ΛCDM cosmology. The inference to the existence of dark energy relies in no
small measure on observations of Type Ia supernovae, under the assumption that they are
practically identical and can therefore be used as standard candles. Yet it is not entirely clear
that all Type Ia supernovae are the same, indeed there might be two dominant sub-classes
that differ in their progenitors (Schaefer, 2010, 276).5 Recurrent nova are candidate Type
Ia supernova progenitors and archival records are crucial for learning about these objects.
According to Schaefer “Archival data is the only way to see the long-term behavior of stars,
unless you want to keep watch nightly for the next century, and this is central to many
front-line astronomy questions”(quoted in LSUNews, LSUNews). The hope is that results
on recurrent nova (and many other phenomena) will be gleaned from the records enriched
by Astronomy Rewind participants.
5According to Schaefer:
supernova cosmology is based on the idea that the luminosity-decline relation has no evo-
lution with redshift [. . . ] The question of evolution is critical as the amount of evolution at
z ∼ 1 is comparable to the difference between cosmologies with and without Dark Energy.
Without knowing the identity of the progenitor, evolution calculations are not possible and
the effect can significantly change the shape of the Hubble diagram. So, in principle, the
progenitor problem is critical for the entire supernova cosmology enterprise
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4.3.2 Reverse direction
One could also envision salvaging a useful empirical constraint from a mal-adapted one by
taking the mal-adapted result and backtracking through the data processing to reconstruct
an earlier adaptable result to be re-processed into a well-adapted constraint. Doing this
would require not only provenance and workflow metadata, but the amenability of the result
to un-processing. It would be analogous to solving a kind of inverse problem. The task
would be to reconstruct upstream intermediary results starting from a downstream result
and then generate a new constraint starting from the reconstructed intermediary.
Despite arduous hunting I have found it extraordinarily difficult to find examples of sal-
vaging useful empirical constraints by this sort of un-processing strategy. The most promising
case that I have found again involves historical astronomical observations. An observation
of a dark spot on the face of the Sun in A.D. 807 during the reign of Charlemagne was
interpreted as the transit of Mercury (van Helden, 1976, 3).6 However, it is impossible to
see the transit of Mercury without a telescope, and so this early observation was probably
of a sunspot instead. Recognizing the observation as of a sunspot however, would have been
difficult for inquirers deeply embedded in an Aristotelian view of the cosmos in which the
Sun and indeed all of the heavens were thought to be perfect and unchanging. Interestingly,
the mistake has been made in the other direction as well. In 1631 Pierre Gassendi (with
the help of an assistant) observed the Sun using a Galilean telescope projected onto paper.
Gassendi observed a spot on the sun but interpreted it as a sunspot when it now seems clear
that he was observing the transit of Mercury on the Sun (ibid., 4). In fact, Gassendi realized
the error himself during the course of his observations (ibid., 4-5).
The reinterpretation of observations of Mercury transits as observations of sunspots, and
vice versa, seem to me to illustrate the reverse direction of salvaging evidence. Pre-telescope
observation records reporting transits of Mercury have to be stripped of that interpretation
and recast as something else. However, this case is not an ideal exemplar because the “un-
processing” required is quite minimal. For instance with regard to the A.D. 807 observation,
it seems that one simply swaps in sunspot for transit of Mercury in the interpretation of the
6See also Stephenson and Clark (1978, 90) and Fitzgerald (1953).
59
record. In addition to such straightforward swaps it would interesting to see an example of
the deliberate undoing of more complicated data processing to recover an earlier adaptable
result for use in a novel epistemic context.
There may be other examples that I do not know about, and if there are it would be
worthwhile to study them. However, the fact that such examples are not forthcoming is
perhaps not so surprising. Solving inverse problems is difficult, especially if one wants to
avoid massive underdetermination. It would make sense if scientists prefer to start with an
extant upstream result and process anew (as in the Babylonian tablets example) rather than
try to reconstruct those upstream results in the first place.
In cases where the upstream results are inaccessible then scientists would be forced to
reconstruct them if they are to salvage the evidence in question. But does this ever actually
happen? It seems that in practice scientists may just give up on salvaging such evidence.
On my view, whether or not giving up is epistemically responsible or not will depend on if
the reconstruction project in question is practically feasible or not. If enough information
is available to carry out the reconstruction, then it ought to be done. Having more tightly
constrained empirically adequate theories means learning more about what the world is like,
and learning more about what the world is like is desirable. However, in a given case it may
not be possible in practice to reconstruct intermediary results from which a well-adapted
constraint can be derived. Thus the strategy of generating a new constraint by reprocessing
may largely be relegated to the realm of theoretical possibility.
4.4 DATA STEWARDSHIP
If one adopts the view of empirical adequacy espoused above, there is good reason to be
seriously concerned with careful documentation and data stewardship, and worried about
the lack of access that scientists in fact have to data and metadata.
Consider again historical astronomical observations. Huber and De Meis lament that
even with widely available and trustworthy transliterations and translations of Babylonian
eclipse records, one still wants access to the original clay tablets:
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It is not easy to work directly with the Babylonian source texts—broken eclipse records
are hidden in them like needles in a haystack—and one needs a reference extract not only
for easier access, but also for fixing the readings, datings and interpretations upon which
one is basing the analysis. This still holds now, when most of the texts are accessible in
authoritative transliterations and translations. Eclipse records are still hard to locate—
actually, like a human face in a crowd, the tell-take graphic patterns contained in them
may jump into one’s eye more readily from the cuneiform text than from a transliteration or
translation. It goes without saying that an extract cannot give the full context, an therefore
does not replace access to the original sources: photos, hand-copies and text editions such
as those by Sachs and Hunger. (Huber and De Meis, 2004, v)
However, as we have seen, just taking good care of the original data records and to making
them accessible to researchers is not enough to make those data records useful for generating
empirical constraints. In addition, researchers need details about the epistemic context in
which those records were made—they need metadata too.
Information scientists and database curators are among the most sensitive to the impor-
tance of preserving and stewarding metadata. Goodman et al. (2014) express the problem
with terrifying lucidly:
the amount of real data and data description in modern publications is almost never suf-
ficient to repeat or even statistically verify a study being presented. Worse, researchers
wishing to build upon and extend work presented in the literature often have trouble re-
covering data associated with an article after it has been published. More often than
scientists would like to admit, they cannot even recover the data associated with their own
published works (1)
Especially in light of the actual paucity of metadata available to scientists in practice, there
are two objections we ought to consider. First, perhaps losing results over the history of
science is not so bad after all—perhaps we should just let them die. Second, perhaps meta-
data is not really necessary for generating an empirical constraint—perhaps, for instance,
the records of data collection alone are all that are really needed.
What’s so bad about loss? Only about 10% of the Babylonian clay tablets inscribed
with astronomical records have survived to the present day (Stephenson et al., 2016a, 3).
Valuable records of civilizations periodically go up in flames. Moreover, researchers inten-
tionally throw out data constantly. At the very early stages of data processing, outlying
results are often simply excluded. For instance, as Franklin (1981) reports, Millikan’s well-
known results on the fundamental electric charge from his oil-drop experiments relied on 58
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drops while excluding 49. At CERN’s Large Hadron Collider, data from around 600 million
collision events per second is pared down to about 100 or 200 events per second identified as
physically interesting candidates before being recorded and stored.7 The rest is lost to the
aether.8
Given that the loss of data and metadata is so prevalent, is salvaging evidence really
as desirable as I have suggested? One reason for thinking that salvaging evidence is not
so important is that it is sometimes possible to re-do a relevantly similar observation or
experiment to replace lost data. In light of this, perhaps there is no problem with throwing
out the vast majority of collision events from the LHC since the relevant experimental run
can simply be repeated. Rather than trying to decipher the results reported in records of the
original alchemical experiments, perhaps one should reenact the experiments and interpret
the newly minted results afresh.
I think this response is fair enough as far as it goes—that is, for observations and ex-
periments that can in practice be repeated. There are unfortunately some that cannot.
Astronomical events of the sort we have been considering are precisely of this nature. It
is impossible to recreate a historical supernova or eclipse, and yet these occurrences harbor
material from which valuable constraints on theorizing can be wrought. Historical records
furnish empirical constraints on the slow dissipation of the Earth’s angular momentum over
the past few thousand years in a way simply not afforded by contemporary (or future)
observations.
In the context of geoscience research data, the National Research Council has grappled
with this very issue—whether and when it is expedient and epistemically desirable to replace
7https://home.cern/about/computing/processing-what-record
8See Leonelli (2016, 163-4):
The exclusion of old data (sometimes called “legacy data”) is perfectly understandable on
practical grounds, given the difficulties involved in accessing and assembling such results,
their dependence on obsolete technologies and media, the enormous variety in their formats,
and the concerns surrounding their usefulness, which is often questioned given the ever-
changing research contexts in which data are obtained. This compares to similar situations
in other areas, most notably high- energy physics where data from particle accelerators that
have been discontinued are no longer available in usable formats (e.g., the data accumulated
from the predecessor to the Large Hadron Collider at CERN are kept on floppy disks and
thus rarely consulted).
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data rather than preserve it (Committee on the Preservation of Geoscience Data and Col-
lections, 2002). In geoscience, it is often desirable to retain the physical samples collected
from the field such as rocks, cores, and fossils. Preservation of this sort of data requires
lots of space, large and well-organized storehouses. Given limited real estate, difficult deci-
sions must be made about what is worth keeping and what may be reasonably discarded.
Mistakes have already been made. Apparently the deepest well cored in the United States,
the replacement of which would cost an estimated $12.3-16.4 million, has been lost (ibid.,
2). To guide preservation decisions, the Council recommends prioritizing data that are ef-
fectively irreplaceable: “The committee recommends that the highest priority for retention
and preservation be directed toward data and collections that are well documented and im-
possible or extremely difficult to replace” (ibid., 3).9 In addition to these two factors they
recommend taking into consideration potential applications of the data, its accuracy, its
quality/completeness, and the viability of replicating it (ibid., see Table ES-1).
Supposing we set clearly irreplaceable cases aside, I think that there is still reason to
worry about the loss of data and metadata. In losing data scientists lose opportunities to
constrain their theories. Every bit of lost data can be seen as an un-checked liability that
could potentially serve to undermine the empirical adequacy of one’s favorite theory were
it to successfully seed a well-adapted empirical constraint. Scientists should be interested
in any potential threat to the empirical adequacy of their theories since whatever else they
are, good theories should be empirically adequate. To ignore potential falsifiers is just to
stick one’s head in the sand. It does not make them go away. Scientists should be interested
in salvaging old data and in gathering new data, since both activities contribute to the
evidential corpus and thus the accumulation of constraints on empirically viable theorizing.
Moreover, we ought to proceed cautiously in how we construe throwing out data, i.e.
making data “cuts”. Millikan had reasons for throwing out those 49 drops and the high
energy physics collaborations using LHC data also have reasons for structuring their triggers
9The authors note the crucial role of good documentation for the epistemic utility of these data: “All
collections must be well documented before any other assessment of their utility and future can be done.
Indeed, whether or not a rock, fossil, core, or other item is replaceable is completely unknown in the absence
of adequate documentation to access uniqueness” (Committee on the Preservation of Geoscience Data and
Collections, 2002, 3). In other words, one would not even know whether to keep or discard a sample without
access to good provenance metadata.
63
as they do. The reasons that researchers have for throwing out data can be codified amongst
the many presuppositions that enter into an enriched line of evidence, alongside, say, the
presuppositions involved in preparing the experimental apparatus or in conducting the ob-
servation that produces the data in the first place. Indeed there can be very good reasons
for setting data aside. Recall the discussion of ancient Chinese astronomical observations
used for constraining contemporary theorizing about supernovae from Chapter 3. Clark and
Stephenson found a Chinese record of a ko-hsing (“visiting star”) from 902 AD that clearly
describes it as having moved, suggesting that it was a tail-less comet, but which also claims
the star was visible for a whole year, suggesting that it was not a comet (ibid., 45). The
authors speculate that perhaps the word for “year” was mistakenly inserted for what should
have been “day”, or that perhaps there were two different new stars, but the matter has
not be satisfactorily settled and they conclude: “Regretfully we must abandon the AD 902
star as of uncertain nature” (ibid.). This example shows that for some lines of evidence,
the earliest recoverable result is not adaptable to contemporary theory. The observational
record of the AD 902 event cannot be used to constrain theories of the mechanisms involved
in supernova explosions given the limited available documentation, it has to be left aside.
What one wants to avoid is cherry-picking data by throwing out the pieces that seed
constraints inconsistent with one’s theory for that very reason. Thinking in this way has
the consequence that it is not permissible to exclude outliers or anomalies simply because
they are outliers or anomalies. If these are to be excluded, there should be some rationale
for doing so. Perhaps the apparatus was not calibrated properly, perhaps the data reflects
unaccounted for backgrounds, perhaps someone made a mistake...whatever it is, something
or other ought to be blamed when data is excluded.10
There is a sense in which data that are excluded with rationale are not really lost. There
are two sort of cases to consider. In the first sort, lack of metadata makes the constraint that
one can generate from the data less crisp than it would otherwise be. For the observation
record of the ko-hsing of AD 902, if more metadata were available, it might be possible
to settle whether the object in question should be classed as a supernova or as a comet.
10Millikan it seems was guilty of the bad sort of data exclusion in that he excluded some drops simply
because the implied value for the charge of the electron disagreed markedly with his best value Franklin
(1981, 195).
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If the verdict fell to supernova, then the observation record in question could be used as
the basis for a constraint on contemporary theorizing about supernovae. Yet in absence
of such metadata, the record can at best serve as the basis for a softened constraint. Our
astronomical theories still need to be consistent with constraints derived from it, but those
constraints will evidently not discern between supernovae and comets.
The second sort of case are those in which new presuppositions serve to show that any
constraints derived from the data would fall outside of the scope of the theory to be con-
strained. For instance, it might turn out that the particular triggers used to cut collision
events at the LHC render the constraints derived from the recorded data mal-adapted to
some future epistemic context. If that turns out to be the case then new data, new processing
or both will be desirable. In such cases, the data might very well still be useful for generating
empirical constraints on theorizing—these just might not be the constraints initially antici-
pated. Recall the case of the “perytons” mentioned at the beginning of Section 4.3. Once the
signal picked up by the radio telescope had been correlated with premature microwave oven
door openings, the characteristics of that signal could no longer be used to constrain theo-
ries about exotic extragalactic astronomical phenomena as had originally been hoped. The
characteristics of the signal could perhaps still be used as empirical constraints on theories
of something else (microwave oven emissions? coffee drinking habits of radio astronomers?).
The data are not lost exactly. Furthermore, the characteristics of the signal interpreted as
originating from the observatory kitchen are not inconsistent with theories of extragalactic
phenomena. Rather, they are consistent by default in virtue of falling outside of the scope
of those theories. Thus, when the peryton signals were attributed to the microwave oven,
they shifted outside of the scope of astronomical theories without disrupting the empirical
adequacy of those theories and without being lost entirely.
I have suggested that there is indeed reason to worry about loss of evidence because
lost evidence piles up as un-checked epistemic liabilities and because throwing out evidence
(rather than softening it or shifting the scope under which it falls) is just anti-empiricist
cherry-picking. There is another reason to worry about loss of evidence. If, over the history
of science, the corpus of evidence is not cumulative then it will be difficult to makes sense of
how we have learned more about they way that the world is through scientific inquiry. If the
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evidence of the Babylonians, or of pre-relativistic physics, is not our evidence in what sense
could we see our own theories as accounting for more phenomena, more experience, more
observations, than our predecessors? Without cummulativity, accounting for our evidence
is just accounting for different evidence than our predecessors, not more. All this is to say
that loss of evidence due to sub-optimal data stewardship really is a problem that ought to
be addressed with full vigor.
What’s so important about metadata? I have argued that adjudicating the em-
pirical adequacy of a theory with respect to some evidence always requires access to some
metadata—at least metadata associated with the provenance of the original records of data
collection, and sometimes much more metadata about the data processing workflow and
the presuppositions that have been incorporated throughout it. But is metadata really
necessary? For instance, in the examples of historical astronomical observations discussed
above, it might look like the records of data collection are all that are required to generate
empirical constraints. Aren’t the constraints generated from the Babylonian clay tablets
themselves? Similarly, in the case of generating constraints from published results in the As-
tronomy Rewind project, aren’t the constraints being generated from the published results
themselves?
In both cases I think that metadata is still necessary for generating empirical constraints
with any epistemic utility. The Babylonian clay tablets by themselves are utterly useless.
As we have already seen, one needs extensive background knowledge about the cultural
circumstances in which these records were produced in order to translate them into something
useful for contemporary astronomers. One needs to know a lot about cuneiform script, a
lot about the metrical units and calendars to which the inscriptions refer, and it helps if
one knows lots else besides—like the height of the walls of Babylon. Without this enriching
information about the provenance of the records, they cannot serve as the basis for useful
empirical constraints.
In the case of Astronomy Rewind the very purpose of the project is to make explicit
metadata that is contained in text and other circumstantial features of the published results.
By attending to the axes labels, captions, context on the page etc., it is hoped that useful
information can be extracted from plots, pictures, and diagrams that would otherwise be as
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useless for constraining theory as scraps of unidentified detritus in laboratory drawers.
That some metadata is necessary to generate empirical constraints with any epistemic
utility does not settle the question of how much metadata is required. Is there some minimum
amount of metadata that one can get away with in order to generate a useful constraint?
Although I have largely drawn examples from astronomy, the case for good stewardship
of data and metadata is also obvious in the context of archiving environmental (especially
climate) data. Thus the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) rec-
ommends: “Metadata that adequately document and describe each archived data set should
be created and preserved to ensure the enhancement of knowledge for scientific and societal
benefit” (Committee on Archiving and Accessing Environmental and Geospatial Data at
NOAA, 2007, 43). In the context of NOAA data, they provide a useful precisification of
what counts as minimally “adequate” metadata:
Metadata are all the pieces of information necessary for data to be independently under-
stood by users, to ensure proper stewardship of the data, and to allow for future discovery.
This information should include, at a minimum: a thorough description of each data set,
including its spatial and temporal resolution; the time and location of each measurement,
and how the data were originally collected or produced; and a thorough documentation of
how the data have been managed and processed, including information about any media
and format migrations, the accessibility of the data, and the algorithms or procedures used
for any reprocessing, revisions, or error corrections. Collectively, these pieces of information
are what make the data in an archive useful. (ibid.)
The sort of metadata (and how much of it) will be required in a given epistemic context
will largely be determined by the nature of the theory to be constrained and the manner in
which it is to be constrained. Therefore it will be easier to specify more concretely what sort
of enriching information will be required to constrain the theory at hand from the vantage
point of a particular epistemic context. Nevertheless, I think that something like the minimal
requisite metadata specified by NOAA in the quote above could serve as a useful guide for
making decisions about documentation in many contexts in such a way that anticipates a
wide variety of subsequent applications.11 Metadata documentation should include thorough
11The NOAA recommendation is similar to that implied by Committee on Ensuring the Utility and
Integrity of Research Data in a Digital Age (2009): “raw data are typically of use only to the research group
that generated them. To be useful to others, data must be accompanied by metadata that describe the
content, structure, processing, accesses conditions, and source of the data [. . . ] For observational data, the
documentation of the hardware, instrumental calibrations, preprocessing of data, and other circumstances
of the observation are generally essential for using data” (106).
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information on data provenance and processing. Determining what counts as sufficiently
thorough will depend on the nature of the data in question and the epistemic pull to include
ever more metadata will be tempered in practice by the availability of resources to do so
and the ability of those making documentation decisions to discern what metadata could be
important for the subsequent utility of the data.
In addition to the minimally adequate metadata documentation, NOAA also specifies
what documentation would “ideally” include:
Ideally, metadata should also describe appropriate applications of the data, the relationship
between the data and other data both within and outside of the archive, and enough high-
level information to allow different types of users to find and understand the data. Adding
these additional pieces of information would help support the discovery and integration of
data across different archives and disciplines. (ibid.)
This characterization seems roughly generalizable as well. Ideally, in general, it would be
desirable for information about data relationships and applicability to be included in the
enriching information associated with a line of evidence. Of course, such information can
only be included in metadata documentation if it has already been determined, but in general
we cannot expect epistemic agents to be able to anticipate all of the contraindications and
applications of any given data. Sometimes it only becomes clear in hindsight what sort of
metadata it would have been desirable to have documented thoroughly.
One might be tempted to ask: ideally, should all data and metadata be preserved and
made accessible? However, this question invites relatively unhelpful speculation since it will
never be possible to accomplish this ideal in practice. There will always be context-dependent
practical trade-offs to be made in the task of data stewardship. Nevertheless, two lessons
from the account of empirical adequacy proposed here may be emphasized. First, all of the
enriching information of an enriched line of evidence is implicated in the epistemic utility of
the empirical result in which that line culminates, even if no one in practice ever makes all
of it explicit. Second, as I have already stated, at the very least some enriching information
about the provenance of the records of data collection will be required. The provenance of
the records of data collection will determine to which theories results subsequently generated
from those records can by applied as constraints, and which they will fall outside of the scope
of.
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Responsible adjudication of empirical adequacy relies on the accessibility of evidential
resources—data records, empirical results, and metadata regarding the manner in which
these were generated. Unfortunately, these very resources are often discarded in practice.
This has consequences: our favorite scientific theories are not as tightly constrained as they
might be if we took better care of our evidential resources. Furthermore, the paucity of
records of data and metadata might make us nervous about whether or not the theories that
we currently take to be empirically adequate have in fact been adjudicated in an epistemi-
cally responsible way. Fortunately the way forward is clear—ordinary good, thorough, data
stewardship and the utilization of the stewarded resources in the adjudication of empirical
adequacy.
4.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Explicating the notion of empirical adequacy reveals the under-appreciated extent of aux-
iliary information required to constrain theory in an epistemically responsible way. Data
processing often introduces substantive presuppositions on which results are conditioned. I
have presented a characterization of empirical adequacy and outlined the conditions under
which such adjudication is possible. Repurposing, replicating, and even judging the rele-
vance of empirical results implicates a rich reservoir of metadata about how those results
were generated. The good news is that on the view presented here, we have the resources to
appreciate the continuity of evidence across epistemic contexts by seeing the ways in which
even heavily conditioned evidence can be salvaged. The bad news is that scientists rarely
seem to have the information required to judge the relevance of results to the theories they
would like to constrain, let alone actually produce the desired empirical constraint. Ap-
preciating the fine-grained structure of the epistemology of empirical adequacy renders the
need for concerted efforts to preserve, curate, and disseminate evidential resources strikingly
apparent.
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5.0 THE VARIETIES OF EMPIRICAL CONSTRAINT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Scientists are equipped with a wide variety of strategies for generating empirical constraints
on theorizing. The variety in strategies engenders a corresponding variety in the nature of
the constraints they produce. In this chapter, I focus on characterizing one strategy for gen-
erating constraints that has not yet received due attention in philosophy of science. I argue
that putting bounds on a parameter is sufficiently distinct to constitute an interesting genus
in its own right. In part, my aim is to contribute to a more accurate and nuanced description
of scientific methodology. In addition, I suggest that explicating the variety of strategies for
generating empirical constraints furnishes the resources for certain prescriptions. Different
strategies are appropriate for different epistemic contexts, and awareness of the variety of
strategic options can help to guard against abandoning the hope of generating constraints
too early. Some cosmologists have recently been tempted by this latter possibility in the
context of theories of the early universe. I conclude this chapter by using the resources
developed here to show why such temptation ought to be resisted.
5.1.1 An epistemic shift
In December 2014, something rare happened: two distinguished cosmologists addressed
philosophers in print. The cosmologists, George Ellis and Joe Silk, published their provoca-
tively titled article “Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics” in the Comment
section of the journal Nature. The authors were apparently incited to write the piece out
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of exasperation with methodological attitudes in the physics community itself.1 The article
begins,
This year, debates in physics circles took a worrying turn. Faced with difficulties in applying
fundamental theories to the observed Universe, some researchers called for a change in how
theoretical physics is done. They began to argue explicitly that if a theory is sufficiently
elegant and explanatory, it need not be tested experimentally, breaking with centuries of
philosophical tradition of defining scientific knowledge as empirical. We disagree. As the
philosopher of science Karl Popper argued: a theory must be falsifiable to be scientific.
The model of the scientific method that these physicists have in mind seems to be traditional
hypothesis testing wherein for an hypothesis H and test implication of the hypothesis I
(borrowed from Hempel, 1965, 7):
If H is true, then so is I.
But (as the evidence shows) I is not true.
H is not true
Consider for instance the hypothesis of the 19th century physician Ignaz Semmelweis,
which Hempel discusses, investigating the cause of childbed fever in Vienna’s General Hos-
pital: that the appearance of the priest (preceded by an attendant ringing a bell) so terrified
patients that they became more susceptible to sickness. If this hypothesis were true, then
if the priest were to take a roundabout route without the bell (rather than walk through
five wards on his way to the sickroom) the mortality rate in the First Division should have
decreased. It did not. Therefore the hypothesis was to be rejected. This method, Ellis and
Silk implied, is how science ought to be done—and cosmology is no exception.
In addition to calling out the physicists, they mention philosopher Richard Dawid by
name, attributing “a philosophical case to weaken the testability requirement for fundamen-
tal physics” to him.2 Ellis and Silk reacted to Dawid’s philosophy with a call for more and
deeper interdisciplinary dialog:
1The severity of the situation was corroborated by another article, a New York Times opinion piece by
Adam Frank and Marcelo Gleiser, both scientists, in June of 2015 titled “A Crisis at the Edge of Physics”.
2Note that testability and falsifiability are used interchangeably in the article. See Kragh (2014) for
a list exhibiting a variety of notions that physicists may have in mind when speaking of “testability”. I
think traditional hypothesis testing is what Dawid considers the “canonical view” that his non-empirical
confirmation is supposed to amend (cf. 2016, 191).
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We applaud the fact that Dawid, Carroll and other physicists have brought the problem
out into the open. But the drastic step that they are advocating needs careful debate. This
battle for the heart and soul of physics is opening up at a time when scientific results –
in topics from climate change to the theory of evolution – are being questioned by some
politicians and religious fundamentalists. Potential damage to public confidence in science
and to the nature of fundamental physics needs to be contained by deeper dialogue between
scientists and philosophers.
In fact, they concluded the article by calling for a conference to be convened in the following
year to begin to address what they saw as the pressing action item: rigorous philosophical
engagement on the connection between the scientific method and empirical testability. Dawid
took them up on the offer and convened a conference in Munich in December of 2015 with
the explicit mission of having physicists and philosophers hash out the issue together.
This sort of dialog is so unusual that it warrants further attention. Physicists rarely take
any concerted interest in the work of philosophers. If they engage with any philosophy of
science at all it is almost certainly with a stance on the importance of falsifiability that they
attribute to Karl Popper (Ellis and Silk are evidently no exception). Physicists typically
have no understanding of the state of contemporary advances in philosophy of science, nor
even a good grip on the sort of projects and questions that philosophers of science would
find engaging today. The fact that the result of this recent encounter seems to have been to
mainline Dawid’s particular non-empirical application of Bayesian confirmation theory is, I
think, cause for some concern. Concern is warranted in part because there are indeed real
and pressing methodological and epistemological questions arising in contemporary physics.
For instance, scientists are hotly debating amongst themselves how theories of the early
universe are to be constrained. Kragh (2014) has raised the possibility that debates such
as this one may be signs of a full scale “epistemic shift” in cosmology—a shift away from
presuming a tight connection between empirical testability and scientific credibility. And
interestingly, as Ellis and Silk intimate, the physicists are having this debate in public.
For instance, in a 2017 Scientific American article, physicists Ijjas, Steinhardt, and Loeb,
conclude “inflationary cosmology, as we currently understand it, cannot be evaluated using
the scientific method” and suggest that by nevertheless refusing to abandon the inflationary
paradigm, some scientists “have proposed that [...] science must change by discarding one
of its defining properties: empirical testability” thereby “promoting the idea of some kind
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of nonempirical science”.3
One fairly clear case of cosmologists instantiating a shift towards non-empirical methods
is the defense of the eternal cyclic universe cosmology offered by proponents Paul Steinhardt
and Neil Turok. According to that theory our universe lives on a surface in a higher-
dimensional space (a “brane”) and very close by in this space there is another such brane
that periodically collides with our own, thereby causing successive “big bangs” on the order
of every trillion years. The basic scenario is as follows. The branes collide as a result of a
springlike force (the “interbrane force”) between them (Steinhardt and Turok, 2002, 1437).
The potential energy density associated with this force is positive when the branes are far
apart after a rebound, which causes the expansion of the branes to accelerate. Because of
the nature of the interbrane force, the energy density then passes through zero and becomes
negative, which eventually causes the branes to collide again.
Note that an eternal cyclic model is indistinguishable in principle from a finite cyclic
model. The claim that cycles are similar, periodic, and occur eternally cannot be supported
by observational or experimental evidence even in principle. Instead of empirical support,
Steinhardt and Turok offer non-empirical support by claiming that the eternal cyclic model
has significant explanatory power, namely that it explains why there is a dark energy com-
ponent in the energy density of the universe.
In particular, they suggest that the eternal cyclic model “naturally” provides dark energy
a key role in cosmic history (ibid., 1439). The best reconstruction that I can muster of the
explanation Steinhardt and Turok offer is a teleological explanation whose telos is the eternal
nature of the universe. Consider the following quotes in which Turok and Steinhardt invoke
their eternal cyclic scenario to explain the presence of dark energy:
[T]he cyclic model leads naturally to the prediction of quintessence and cosmic acceleration,
explaining them as essential elements of an eternally repeating universe. (ibid., 1439)
Each cycle may be almost identical to the one before it, and the presence of the cosmological
constant allows for a stably periodic solution in which the cycles continue forever. (Turok,
2003, 786)
3In response to the Ijjas et al. article, 33 disgruntled scientists wrote a collective piece that reacts to their
conclusions with the flat response: “We have no idea what scientists they are referring to.” This suggests
taking the “crisis” type claims with a grain of salt.
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If a periodic cyclic solution is to be an attractor, it is essential that positive dark energy
be present to redshift away the density inhomogeneities present form the previous cycle so
they do not accumulate and make the universe more and more inhomogeneous with every
cycle. (ibid., 798)
[D]ark energy is just what is needed to restore the branes to a flat, parallel state, thereby
allowing the collisions to repeat in a regular manner. (Steinhardt and Turok, 2007, 168)
In other words: if we are to have the eternal cyclic solution (which is conceptually desirable
for other reasons) then our theory must have some component that blocks inhomogeneities
from accumulating across successive cycles because if the theory predicts that they do accu-
mulate then it is falsified by the apparent homogeneity of our observable universe on large
scales. In other words, if dark energy is present then a cyclic universe is possible. The power
of this teleological explanation is apparently supposed to provide support for the eternal
cyclic model.
I take it that this is an example of the sort of reasoning that Ellis and Silk think needs
to be deflected if the integrity of science is to be maintained. But Ellis and Silk make
use of precious few philosophical resources in their defense. Engaging almost exclusively
with a caricature of Popperian falsifiability straitjackets the scientists who are trying to get
clear on the methods appropriate for their own disciplines. It corners them into a kind of
false dilemma: either speculative theorizing is not scientific (because not falsifiable), or is
indeed scientific, but because empirical evidence is not crucial for theory choice after all.
The dilemma is false of course, because there are plenty of ways to retain a crucial role for
empirical evidence in theory choice without demanding that all science model Semmelweis-
style rejection of hypotheses.
5.1.2 Resisting the shift
It would be good to be able to meet the epistemological and methodological questions that
the physicists themselves are raising with the resources of a robust empiricism from the
philosophical side of the aisle. Instead, what seems to have happened so far is that Richard
Dawid’s minority viewpoint has gotten disproportionate coverage. If Ellis and Silk are right
that this is a “battle for the heart and soul of physics”, then Dawid’s philosophical campaign
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has been conspicuously free of challengers.
According to Dawid, a major point in favor of a role for non-empirical confirmation is that
in historical sciences “the general character of scientific hypotheses in those fields often makes
it difficult to extract specific and quantitative predications from them” (Dawid, 2016, 192).
He thinks that this feature, in conjunction with the fact that “those scientific fields often
deal with empirical situations where most of the empirical record has been irretrievably lost
to natural decay or destruction” renders empirical confirmation “patchy” and incapable of
supporting trust in the theory in question (ibid.)4 For Dawid, this lack of support constitutes
a lacuna for non-empirical confirmation to fill.
A great example of precisely what Dawid refers to—a field in which “specific and quan-
titative predictions” are difficult to extract—is indeed contemporary physical cosmology. In
this context, traditional hypothesis testing is not always readily applicable due to the rela-
tively underdeveloped status of theorizing in the field. The nature of dark energy is as yet so
mysterious that concrete physically plausible proposals are just not available. Observations
of Type Ia supernovae imply the accelerated expansion of the universe and “dark energy”
names whatever it is that is responsible for that acceleration. One cannot test a hypothesis
that one has not formulated in the first place. Happily, hypothesis testing (a` la Semmel-
weis) certainly does not exhaust the variety of strategies that scientists have for generating
empirical constraints on theorizing.
In fields where theory is relatively underdeveloped, it is sometimes desirable to constrain
the space of empirically viable theories without actually specifying them individually. In such
cases, the following strategy can be useful for constraining theorizing instead of traditional
hypothesis testing:
4The meaning of “trust” in this context is not totally clear. Later in the piece Dawid writes:
we understand trust in a theory in terms of the theory’s empirical predictions rather than
in terms of truth. If a scientist trusts a theory, she believes that the theories predictions in
its characteristic regime, if tested, will get empirically confirmed. If a theory’s predictions
in its characteristic regime are indeed in agreement with all possible data, the theory shall
be called empirically viable. (ibid., 194)
This characterization supports reading Dawid’s notion of trust as roughly van Fraassen’s version of accep-
tance, namely, belief that a theory is empirically adequate, where adequacy is determined with respect to
all possible observations.
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Putting bounds on a parameter Model the phenomenon of interest with a generic
parameter that refrains from committing to unmotivated assumptions about its nature.
Construct an inference chain that connects empirical data to that parameter.
The requisite inference chain may have to proceed in many steps via intermediary param-
eters that represent other phenomena that are presumed to physically mediate between the
sources from which the data are collected and the phenomenon of primary interest. Recent
efforts to constrain theories of dark energy illustrate this strategy. Within the now-standard
framework of ΛCDM cosmology, dark energy is modeled as one among a handful of ingre-
dients contributing to the total energy density of the universe. Some of the most basic
questions that one can ask about dark energy are unanswered at present. For instance, does
dark energy function as a cosmological constant (contributing the same energy density to
the total budget over all cosmic epochs) or does its contribution vary in time? In an attempt
to answer this question, cosmologists represent whole families of different models of dark en-
ergy. Making some assumptions about the nature of dark energy, it can be characterized by
an equation of state parameter w, the ratio of the “pressure” and energy density associated
with it. A cosmological constant would correspond to w = −1, and so the question of the
time variability of dark energy becomes a question about whether the value of w departs
from −1 or not. Cosmologists then use “probes” such as supernovae, gravitational lensing,
galaxy clusters, and Baryon Acoustic Oscillations to constrain the phenomenology of dark
energy via w. Posed thus, empirical constraints can be placed on the equation of state
parameter w thereby whittling away the space of empirically viable models of dark energy
(generically construed). All this is accomplished without the traditional formula of speci-
fying a particular theory, identifying a particular hypothesis, deriving a concrete prediction
from that hypothesis, and testing the prediction against empirical results whose relevance is
determined by the prediction.
In the specific case of dark energy, the inference chain required to generate constraints
on dark energy theorizing connects data collected on the probes (like supernovae) to the
generic parameter w by passing through intermediary parameters like apparent magnitude
and luminosity distance.
Although it will take further work (see section 5.3.1) to argue that this strategy is not well-
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characterized as traditional hypothesis testing after all, we can already note a conspicuous
difference. A particular hypothesis is simply not specified in the former—and for good reason.
Efforts to understand mysterious phenomena are not always aided by specific hypothesis
about them. This might suggest that, supposing my argument below for the dissimilarity
with respect to hypothesis testing is compelling, this strategy is better countenanced as
some kind of exploratory experimentation. After all, exploratory experimentation too is
motivated by epistemic contexts where little is known about the phenomenon of interest and
thus where hypotheses regarding the nature of the phenomenon have not yet been specified.
In section 5.3.2 I will present an extant account of exploratory experimentation (as systematic
parameter variation) and argue that this suggestion does not pan out. Finally, in section 5.4
I will argue the efficacy of the strategy elucidated in section 5.2 shows how epistemic progress
can indeed be made in contexts where it can be difficult to make “specific and quantitative
predictions”, and that therefore we have no need for recourse to the non-empirical.
Before I present these arguments, I illustrate the proposed strategy in more detail by
exhibiting the inference chain for constraining w in slightly higher resolution. The purpose of
this illustration is to both document an actual instance of the strategy in scientific practice
in order to demonstrate that its characterization is not speculative and also to furnish details
that will be useful in making the two arguments just mentioned.
5.2 PUTTING BOUNDS ON THE DARK ENERGY EQUATION OF
STATE PARAMETER
Contemporary cosmologists model the universe as a solution to Einstein’s field equations by
making the idealizing assumption that all of the matter/energy in it is distributed homoge-
neously and isotropically.5 The dynamics of the universe can then be characterized by an
equation relating the components that contribute to the energy density of the universe to
5The exposition here follows section 2.2. of Weinberg et al. (2013). Note that others make slightly
different choices in notation, for instance writing  for energy density rather that u. Besides notational
choices there is nothing non-standard about the formalism and modeling explicated here.
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the evolution of a scale factor that tracks distances in spacetime, the Friedmann equation6
H2(z)
H20
= Ωm(1 + z)
3 + Ωr(1 + z)





The unknown dark energy component is modeled as an ideal fluid which, as I said above,
one can associate with the equation of state parameter w equal to its “pressure” pφ over its
energy density, the uφ in equation 5.1, i.e.
w(z) = pφ(z)/uφ(z) (5.2)
For constant w, the expression in the far right term of equation 5.1 would be:
uφ(z)
uφ(z = 0)
= (1 + z)3(1+w) (5.3)
A true cosmological constant, that is a dark energy component whose corresponding
energy density does not vary with time/redshift, corresponds to w = −1.
A strategy, exemplified by the Dark Energy Task Force (DETF) for making headway on
the nature of dark energy is to
1. determine as well as possible whether the accelerating expansion is consistent with a
cosmological constant, i.e., unevolving dark-energy density
2. measure as well as possible any time evolution of the dark energy density (Albrecht,
Amendola, Bernstein, Clowe, Eisenstein, Guzzo, Hirata, Huterer, Kolb, and Nichol, Al-
brecht et al., section D)
To accomplish this, cosmologists need to get empirical evidence to hook up with the param-
eter w. They want to determine whether w deviates from −1 (addressing point 1 above) and
if it does, to map the evolution over time (point 2). The next step in hooking up theorizing
about dark energy to empirical evidence involves specifying a parameterization of w. There
6The Ωs are the energy densities of the different components (m for matter, r for radiation, k for curvature,
and φ for the unknown dark energy component) normalized with respect to the total energy density that
would produce flat spatial geometry. z is redshift, and H is the Hubble parameter which is just the time
derivative of the scale factor (usual a) over the scale factor. H0 is the Hubble parameter today.
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are choices about how to do this.7 The DETF, for instance, uses a two-parameter model:
w(a) = w0 + wa(1− a) (5.6)
Figure 3 represents empirical constraints on theorizing about dark energy via the dark
energy equation of state parameter.8
So much for preliminaries. At this point we have not yet done much to elucidate how
exactly empirical constraints on theorizing about dark energy work. For instance, we have
not yet exposed how the various datasets referenced in Figure 3 are cajoled into pronouncing
upon the empirical adequacy of various possible values of wa and w0. In order to get at these
details, we will have to peel back another layer.
5.2.1 Observables
At a coarse descriptive grain, energy density in the form of dark energy contributes to the
total energy density and thereby to both the geometry of the universe and the evolution of
the scale factor. Moreover, accelerated expansion driven by dark energy serves to slow the
gravitational collapse of overdense regions, i.e. slow the growth of structure in the universe.
Thus, one can hope to learn about the nature of dark energy by understanding the evolution
of distances and material structures in the universe.
These physical associations between the nature of dark energy on one hand and distances
7Other options include a simple Taylor expansion
w(z) = w0 + w
′z + . . . (5.4)
or
w(a) = wp + wa(ap − a) (5.5)
where ap is a “pivot” value of the scale factor chosen to minimize the correlation between errors associated
with wp and with wa. Another approach is to approximate w(z) with a stepwise-constant function defined
in discrete bins over some range of allowed values.
8 The shaded areas delimit the region that the parameter values associated with the true model can be
expected to lie within with 95% confidence (light) and 68% (dark), given the specified datasets. The datasets
considered here are denoted by TT (the Planck 2015 cosmic microwave background temperature data), lowP
(low-l polarization), ext (BAO, JLA, H0) and WL. JLA stands for Joint Light-curve Analysis. It involves
supernovae data from the SuperNova Legacy Survey (SNLS) and the Sloan Digital Sky Survey (SDSS) (for
references see Planck Collaboration, 2016a, 25). BAO (baryon acoustic oscillations) data come from SDSS
and from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey (BOSS), (ibid. 24). The WL (weak lensing) data
comes from CFHTLenS (ibid., 28).
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Figure 3: Constraints on dark energy equation of state parameters, from Planck Collabora-
tion (2016a, 40)
and structures on the other hand are represented in the formalism by way of intermediary
“observables”. These are certainly not observables in the typical philosopher’s sense meaning
observable by human eyes. They are better construed as intermediary parameters, i.e. pa-
rameters that serve some mediating role between data and the parameter on which bounds
are eventually sought. In this case, relevant observables are H(z) the Hubble parameter,
D(z) (either luminosity or angular diameter distance), and G(z) the growth function (cf.
Weinberg et al., 2013, 98). We have already encountered H(z) above in the Friedmann
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equation, but the other two parameters warrant some further discussion.
There are many operationalizations of “distance” in astronomy. If two objects of the
same intrinsic luminosity are placed at different distances from the observer, the farther
one will appear less luminous. If two objects of the same intrinsic diameter are placed at
different distances from the observer, the farther one will appear smaller. Thus both apparent
luminosity and apparent diameter can serve as proxies for transverse distance. Expressions
for luminosity distance and angular diameter distance are given in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Intermediary parameters, from Albrecht, Amendola, Bernstein, Clowe, Eisenstein,
Guzzo, Hirata, Huterer, Kolb, and Nichol (Albrecht et al., 29)
The growth function G(z) represents the evolution of the density of matter over cosmic
history. Consider an initial distribution of matter/energy in the universe that is relatively
uniform and then consider fluctuations added to that distribution that render some places
in the universe more dense than average. Assuming the matter to be pressureless dark
matter subject to gravity, on large scales the evolution of density fluctuations follows linear
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perturbation theory. In the context of general relativity (see Weinberg et al., 2013, 97) the
linear growth function G(t)9 obeys




0 (1 + z)
3GGR = 0 (5.7)
Solutions can only be written for particular forms of H(z), which would require specifying a
particular dark energy model by furnishing its energy density uφ(z). To avoid this one can
consider an approximation of the logarithmic growth rate of the perturbations
fGR(z) ≡ d lnGGR
d ln a
≈ [Ωm(z)]γ (5.8)















γ = 0.55 + 0.05[a+ w(z = 1)] (5.10)
which exhibits the connection between G(z) and the dark energy equation of state parameter
w.
Thus, one step in generating a constraint on w is to identify connections in the repre-
sentational formalism between w and intermediary “observables”. As Weinberg et al. (2013)
note, the connection of the intermediary observables to the representation of dark energy in
the formalism goes through the Friedmann equation:
The properties of dark energy influence the observables – H(z), D(z) (either luminosity





This connection is part of what affords the strategy for generating empirical constraints on
w:
The above considerations lead to the following general strategy for probing the physics of
cosmic acceleration: use the observations to constrain the functions H(z), D(z), and G(z),
and use these constraints in turn to constrain the history of w(z) for dark energy models
(ibid., 99)
9The variable t is for our purposes functionally equivalent to the variable z (redshift) used above.
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However, this step—connecting w to observables—is not yet enough of the story for us
to clearly see how empirical constraints on theorizing about dark energy are generated, and
therefore not enough to clearly see what the nature of these constraints are. A second major
step is required to get from the observables to actual empirical results.
5.2.2 Hooking up the observables
Supernovae, gravitational lensing, galaxy clusters, and Baryon Acoustic Oscillations are
probes of observables relevant to dark energy. To take just one of these as an example,
measuring the luminosity curves of Type Ia supernovae (SNe Ia) can be used to constrain the
intermediary parameter (“observable”)H(z). SNe Ia are stars that explode in a characteristic
way such that the evolution of the light that they output over the course of the explosion
follows nearly the same form. Recording the apparent magnitude of SNe Ia over time yields
data like those plotted in the top part of Figure 5. The similarity between the output of these
different supernovae can be made more obvious by applying a stretching transformation to
yield the plot on the bottom of the figure. Since the similarity is thought to be intrinsic to
the SNe Ia, the apparent dissimilarities between various light curves are attributed to their
different distances from the observer, and can therefore be used to estimate those distances.
To see concretely how data from SNe Ia can be used to constrain observables like H(z), let
us consider in particular the photometric distances estimated from the 3rd year Supernova
Legacy Survey (SNLS).10
SNe Ia candidates were identified in an extensive photometric survey using the Canada-
France-Hawaii Telescope (CFHT). The data initially collected are optical images recorded
using the CFHT digital camera Megacam using four filters. While we do not need all of the
details, it is worth a few stages of the subsequent data processing steps (Guy et al., 2011):
1. Preliminary image processing: standard image processing is performed including bias
10The SNLS astronomers talk about the relationship between the observations and constraints on dark
energy in ways that are surprising to a philosopher’s ear. They claim for instance that “SNe Ia observations
are currently the most sensitive technique to study dark energy or its alternatives, since they can be used
to directly measure the history of the expansion of the Universe” and “SNe samples [...] give consistent
measurements of the effective equation of state parameter of dark energy (w, the ration of pressure over
density)” (Guy et al., 2011, 2, emphasis added). These remarks are surprising because the steps involved in
connecting the data collected at the CFHT to the parameter w are pretty intricate.
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Figure 5: SNe Ia light curves, from Perlmutter (2003, 54)
subtraction, flat-field correction, and fringe removal
2. Further image processing: sky-background subtraction, astrometry, and photometric
correction
3. Fitting the supernova fluxes
4. Calibration of fluxes using the magnitude of the star BD + 174708 (chosen by convention)
5. Fitting the flux data to a model of supernovae light curves and extracting parameters
including the rest-frame magnitude, shape, and color for each supernova
6. Calculating the distance modulus
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The last step is accomplished via the following equation:
µ = m∗B −M + α× shape− β × C (5.11)
where m∗B is the rest-frame magnitude in the B band, and C is the color parameter, in
this case the (B − V ) color at maximum derived from a weighted combination of various
properties of the light curve (for details see ibid., 12). Here B and V refer to two frequency
ranges of light observed. The particular shape parameter depends on the fitter used in step
5. For the fitter SiFTO for instance, it is (1− s), where s is the stretch factor (related to the
kind of stretching transformation referenced above regarding Figure 5). M is the absolute
magnitude, which is fit along with the two linear coefficients α and β (ibid., 15-16). Note
that the distance modulus µ is related to the distance r in parsecs according to:




To summarize this section so far, the empirical data (optical images of supernovae) are hooked
up to the intermediary parameter distance via further intermediaries, in this case: model
parameters extracted from light curve fits such as rest-frame magnitude, shape, and color.
We have seen that empirical constraints on theorizing about dark energy can be generated by,
for example, connecting up digital images recorded from a telescope to a generic parameter
characterizing a whole space of possible dark energy theories, without ever specifying those
theories or particular hypotheses derived from them.
I suggest that this example demonstrates how epistemic progress can be made in a
circumstance where it is “difficult to extract specific and quantitative predictions” without
relinquishing the uniquely important role of the empirical. I will argue below that this
example provides reason to resist the move that Dawid endorses and that Steinhardt and
Turok exemplify (non-empirical confirmation). First I want to argue that the strategy we
have encountered in this section is interestingly distinct from other more familiar strategies
in science. I do so in order to offer a kind of error theory: the distinctiveness of this strategy
helps to explain why the shift towards the non-empirical seems appealing—the inapplicability
of familiar strategies to cases like dark energy make it seem like we are out of options, but
this appearance only reflects the failure to consider less familiar (but no less legitimately
empirical) strategies.
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5.3 THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGY
5.3.1 Against construing putting bounds on a parameter as traditional hypoth-
esis testing
The strategy of putting bounds on a parameter is not well-characterized as traditional hy-
pothesis testing. On the traditional model of hypothesis testing, some particular implication
of a hypothesis specified in advance is tested against an empirical result. In contrast, putting
bounds on a parameter allows one to constrain the empirically allowed values of that pa-
rameter, even without specifying a particular model that implies some particular parameter
value. In essence, one can get a constraint without making a prediction. This is a particularly
useful approach when theoretically well-motivated proposals are hard to come by.
Are there really no hypotheses and implications being specified when empirical constrain
proceeds through putting bounds on a parameter? One could perhaps think of the whole
wa-w0 plane as a very long conjunction of specific implications of different hypotheses. Each
point in the plane corresponds to a tuple that could in turn be associated with some model
of dark energy. Considered in this light, one could see putting bounds on parameters as a
particularly efficient, but not particularly novel, version of hypothesis testing.
While there is some sense to this proposal, I think it would be ham-fisted. It is not the
case that cosmologists sat around before the Planck 2015 data was analyzed and specified a
very long list of tuples for values of w0 and wa. The whole point of parameterization is to be
able to constrain a swath of values without having to articulate each individual possibility.
Moreover, I think it is useful to maintain a distinction between cases where theoretically
motivated hypotheses are articulated and used to derive particular implications and the
(ham-fisted) sense in which a plane in parameter space can be construed as a specification
of a long list of fine-grained implications. When I said above in the Introduction to this
chapter that “concrete physically plausible proposals are just not available”, I was being a
little misleading. There are some concrete theoretical proposals regarding the nature of dark
energy, see for instance Planck Collaboration et al. (2015) (although the extent to which these
are plausible is subject to debate and these more specific proposals are often parameterized
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themselves). However, even if it were possible to test the implications of these more specific
proposals, this is not what is happening in the case considered above. Parameterizing the
dark energy equation of state allows researchers to make progress constraining theorizing,
even when the shape that such theorizing will take is for the time being relatively opaque.
Even if we maintain that there is an important difference between the plane of param-
eter values and specifying test implications, it seems that there is at least one specific test
implication in play in the dark energy equation of state example, namely w = −1. This
particular prediction is implied by the hypothesis that dark energy is a true cosmological
constant. However, attending to this particular prediction alone would be to ignore the other
constraints that are generated simultaneously (i.e. those on other values for the parameter)
and thereby fails to capture what is so powerful about this strategy for generating empiri-
cal constraints. The prediction w = −1 is constrained, but so too are other values for the
equation of state parameter.
If putting bounds on a parameter is unlike traditional hypothesis testing, perhaps there
are yet other extant methodological frameworks that would suit it more aptly? The dark
energy case fails to fit the traditional model of hypothesis testing in large part because par-
ticular hypotheses and predictions are not specified in advance. That is, this case exemplifies
an epistemic context in which theories of the phenomenon under investigation are not (or
have not yet been) specified. Since this is also true of exploratory experimentation, perhaps
that would be a better fit.
5.3.2 Exploratory experimentation
Some attention has been paid in the philosophy of science to exploratory experiments and
the significance of such research for questions regarding the theory-ladenness or autonomy
of empirical results, conceptual change, progress in science, and realism (see e.g. Galison,
1987; Steinle, 1996, 2002; Franklin, 2005; Marcum, 2010; Stojanovic´, 2013; Karaca, 2013).
Philosophers of science have addressed the issue of scientific research context where theoret-
ical proposals are sparse in the literature on exploratory experimentation. Exploratory ex-
perimentation is contrasted with “theory-driven” experimentation, and the extant literature
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is concerned in large measure to show how experimental research proceeds even in contexts
where theories of the subject of investigation are either in development or as yet absent. I
will argue that the strategy exemplified in the dark energy case is not well represented by
at least one of the most developed and prominent accounts of exploratory experimentation,
that of Steinle (1996).11
Steinle characterizes exploratory experimentation as:
driven by the elementary desire to obtain empirical regularities and to find out proper con-
cepts and classifications by means of which those regularities can be formulated. It typically
takes place in those periods of scientific development in which–for whatever reasons–no well-
formed theory or even no conceptual framework is available or regarded as reliable. Despite
its independence from specific theories, the experimental activity may well be highly sys-
tematic and driven by typical guidelines. They are of a general methodological type. Here
is a list of the most important ones:
 Varying a large number of different experimental parameters,
 determining which of the different experimental conditions are indispensable, which
are only modifying,
 looking for stable empirical rules,
 finding appropriate representations by means of which those rules can be formulated,
 forming experimental arrangements which involve only the indispensable conditions,
thus presenting the rule in particular clarity. Those experiments are typically charac-
terized as “simple,” “elementary,” or “pure” cases.
(S70)
Steinle takes Ampe`re’s experiments with a magnetic needle and electrical wire as a paradigm
example (S66-S67). By varying the relative position between the needle and the wire, Ampe`re
discovered that the needle would always move to be perpendicular to the wire. It is important
for Steinle’s characterization that this experimentation was conducted in the absence of any
well-articulated theory of the subject matter under investigation: “No specific theories of
electricity and magnetism played a role. As a result of the experimentation, a general rule
emerged” (S67). Ampe`re was induced to experiment in the exploratory mode because he
did not have a concrete theory of electromagnetism with which to make predictions that
could then be constrained by a well determined empirical test. Rather, Ampe`re had to
11Colac¸o’s dissertation An Investigation of Scientific Phenomena discusses an alternative mode of ex-
ploratory experimentation that does not obviously involve systematic parameter variation. His account
highlights the manner in which experimentalists engage in exploratory investigation of a phenomenon in the
course of identifying and characterizing the phenomenon in the first place. Although I have no reason to
expect conflict, exploring the extent to which Colac¸o’s framework maps onto the strategy discussed here is
a task for another occasion.
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systemically tinker in order try to determine the nature of the very phenomena with which
he was tinkering.
I take it that Steinle is interested in characterizing methodological steps involved in what
he identifies as exploratory experimentation, which he stresses can be “highly systematic”.
Thus, Steinle (2002) writes:
Far from being a mindless playing around with an apparatus, exploratory experimentation
may well be characterized by definite guidelines and epistemic goals. The most prominent
characteristic of the experimental procedure is the systematic variation of experimental
parameters. The first aim here is to find out which of the various parameters affect the effect
in question, and which of them are essential. Closely connected, there is the central goal
of formulating empirical regularities about these dependencies and correlations. Typically
they have the form of “if–then” propositions, where both the if- and the then-clauses refer
to the empirical level. (419)
Steinle evidently has in mind here propositions such as those Ampe`re might have formulated
in his investigations with the magnetic needle, perhaps of the form: If (under certain condi-
tions) the polarity of the battery is such-and-such, then the orientation of the needle is thus
(cf. 413). The generic procedure of exploratory experimentation then, according to Steinle,
is to systematically vary the parameters of the experiment to try to elicit regularities, by
for instance attending to which parameters are essential for the effect of interest and how
different arrangements of the parameters affect its production (ibid., 419). Putting bounds
on a parameter is importantly dissimilar from this sort of exploratory experimentation, or
so I will now argue.
5.3.3 Against construing putting bounds on a parameter as systematic param-
eter variation
In the dark energy case, constraints on theorizing are achieved by leveraging data from
observables thought to be relevant to the phenomenon in question against a generalized
representation of some basic characteristics of the nature of that phenomenon. Are there
elements of this case that could be construed as analogous to the systematic variation of
the circumstances of an experimental set-up? To accomplish this one would presumably
have to recast the notion of parameter variation as something besides the activity of an
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agent like Ampe`re systematically altering an experimental setup. We would need an ex-
panded account of exploratory science that included exploratory observations in addition to
exploratory experimentation via manipulation and intervention. Perhaps one could construe
naturally occurring variation in systems of interest as exhibiting analogous parameter vari-
ation. We already have the notion of a “natural experiment” wherein conditions found in
nature are composed in such a manner that they can be treated as if they had been prepared
experimentally (cf. Morgan, 2013). Perhaps we could also recognize “natural exploratory
experimentation” wherein natural circumstances have produced systematic variation in the
parameters relevant to some effect of interest such that an observational scientists might
gain access to the relevant empirical results without intervening on an artificially prepared
system.
The circumstances under which dark energy exerts its influence do change in significant
and potentially informative ways over the natural course of cosmic evolution. Dark energy
is thought to be present all along, but the characteristics of the universe vary immensely.
Until about 300,000 years after the big bang, all the matter and radiation in the universe is
in the form of an undifferentiated plasma pervading space nearly uniformly. As the universe
expands and cools, radiation decouples from matter, both dilute progressively, and eventually
the nested structures of starts, galaxies, clusters, and superclusters cohere to form the nodes
and filaments of the cosmic web.
Thus, by probing cosmic history, we are able to gain information about the interaction
of dark energy in significantly distant contexts. For instance, we are able to investigate its
effects when the energy density of the universe was matter dominated and compare that to
effects when the energy density is dominated by dark energy itself (our epoch). To go this
route would be to construe characteristics of the universe such as composition of the energy
density indexed to cosmic time as analogous to “experimental parameters” and to think of
the natural evolution of the cosmos as the mechanism that varies such parameters rather
than a human scientist in the laboratory. Perhaps we will not be able to identify “a large
number” of such parameters (as would be fit an approach closely analogous to Steinle’s) but
it seems plausible that the more such parameters we could identify, the more we stand to
learn about the nature of the phenomenon of interest.
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What is there to be gained by construing the strategy of putting bounds on a parameter
as analogous to systematic experimental parameter variation? One benefit might be to
illuminate the similarities between generating empirical constraints in experimental and in
observational sciences. There is a persistent intuition that the epistemology of experimental
sciences and that of the (merely) observational sciences is different in a way that makes a
difference for the sort of knowledge that we can attain through each (cf. Hacking, 1989). But
does this intuition really bear out? Investigating parallels in the manner suggested above
could help to address this question.
However, even if drawing parallels with parameter variation turns out to be fruitful,
construing the strategy of putting bounds on a parameter as exploring parameter variation
would stop short of capturing the distinctive feature of this strategy for generating empirical
constraints: efficiently representing families of models within one framework. Indeed there
are other clear examples of parameterized representations and family resemblance between
these instances is much stronger than that between the dark energy case and Ampe`re’s
exploratory experimentation. For instance, the parameterized post-Newtonian formalism
(PPN) for representing gravitational theories is another good example that belongs in the
family (see Will, 2014, especially sections 3 and 4). Using the PPN formalism, empirical
results can be used to put bounds on a collection of parameters (γ, β, ξ, α1, α2, α3, ζ1, ζ2, ζ3,
and ζ4) thereby constraining diverse gravitational theories from general relativity, to Brans-
Dicke theory, to f(R) theories, and so on, at the same time (see Figure 6).
Inspired by PPN formalism, cosmologists have recently introduced a parameterized post-
Friedmann framework (PPF) for representing gravitational theories relevant for cosmological
scales. Baker et al. (2013) express the motivation for such a framework as follows:
Constraining modified theories on an individual basis is likely to be an infinite process,
unless our ingenuity at constructing new theories wanes. We need a fast way to test and
rule out theories if we are to drive their population into decline. (1, reference omitted)
The authors stress that “PPF can be used to make statements about unknown regions of
theory space in addition to the testing of known theories. Such statements could be of
use in guiding model builders to the most relevant regions of theory space” (ibid., 1-2).
The formalism allows researchers to put constraints on gravitational theories even when the
91
Figure 6: Current limits on the PPN parameters, Table 4 from Will (2014, 46)
action corresponding to that theory has not been explicitly written down by anyone. That
is, “the PPF framework systematically accounts for allowable extensions to the Einstein field
equations, while remaining agnostic about their precise form” (ibid., 3). The authors suggest
that the PPF formalism can be used in two “modes”, one in which multiple theories that
have been specified before had can be constrained simultaneously, and a second in which
“one can use the framework as an exploratory tool for model building” (ibid., 20).
Another example from cosmology is the parametrization of models of cosmological in-
flation. In the very early universe it is thought that spacetime underwent a brief period of
exponential expansion. The physics driving this period of expansion is represented in a very
general manner, as an unknown scalar field φ that evolves in time according to a potential
V (φ). Different models of inflation correspond to different shapes this potential could have.
A useful parametrization can be constructed from the potential V and its first and second
derivatives with respect to φ (written as Vφ and Vφφ respectively, see Planck Collaboration
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where MPl is the reduced Planck mass. Figure 7 shows empirical constraints on these “slow-
roll” parameters, depicting 68% and 95% confidence regions from data from the Planck
satellite as of 2015 and other data sets. Again, by constraining these parameters, cosmologists
need not specify particular models of inflation but can rather proceed in the exploratory
mode, chipping away at a vast space of viable theories.
Figure 7: Constraints on slow-roll parameters, Figure 10 from Planck Collaboration (2016b,
14)
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Each of the parameterizations that I have discussed in this section—the dark energy
equation of state parameter, the PPN and PPF formalisms, and the slow-roll parameteriza-
tion of models of cosmic inflation—are all examples of species in what I take to be the same
genus: putting bounds on a parameter. The strategy is as follows: construct a representation
that is generic enough to efficiently cover a range of possible theories and then use empirical
results to constrain that space. This approach has the benefit of allowing researchers to
constrain theories even without specifying them. As a result, this approach can be partic-
ularly useful in epistemic contexts where the theoretical resources available regarding the
phenomenon of interest do not provide much guidance (yet) about which among the possible
theories might be worth pursuing.
94
5.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Different epistemic contexts call for different research strategies. In cases where concrete
models or hypotheses can be used to generate specific predictions, effective observational
campaigns attempt to measure or rule them out. In cases where no concrete model or
hypothesis has been generated for some laboratory phenomenon, research can nevertheless
proceed by systematic experimentation. But besides these two there are plenty of contexts
for which other strategies are appropriate. In this chapter I have discussed another context,
one in which researchers seek to understand some natural phenomenon about which theo-
rizing is still relatively under-developed. In such contexts a useful strategy is to constrain
theorizing via generic parameterizations that serve to represent whole families of models.
Such parameterized models can be compared with empirical results, scientists can seek to
place bounds on those parameters to create a “model in relief” fenced in by a perimeter of
empirical results.
There are sure to be many further ways that empirical results can be made to constrain
theorizing beyond those I have discussed here. There are at least two other strategies that
strike me as worth investigating in further detail, which are be exemplified by the following
vignettes:
What is dark matter?
Dark matter is another relatively mysterious aspect of the contemporary cosmological pic-
ture. Again, the name refers to an as yet unknown something, which was originally inferred
from aberrant galactic rotation curves suggesting that the orbits of stars at the out reaches
of galaxies could not be accounted for by the luminous matter contained in those sys-
tems alone. Since the earliest days of dark matter research there have always been several
proposals for what dark matter could be, although the specifics have changed over time.
At first it was plausible that ordinary dim matter–such as hydrogen gas, dust, or burnt
out stars–might account for the anomalous rotation curves. However the contribution of
these ordinary denizens was not enough to fully account for the effect and more exotic
possibilities began to emerge including modifications to gravitational theory and a slew
of weakly interacting massive particles concocted in extensions to the standard model of
particle physics. Further empirical research elicited different constraints on the nature of
dark matter beyond the original galactic rotation curves at a range of scales, e.g. the
motion of galaxy clusters, cosmic mass density maps inferred from surveys of weak gravita-
tion lensing fields, and the Bullet Cluster (the remnant of two colliding clusters of galaxies
which appear to have passed through each other, leaving the interacting luminous matter
clumped in between while taking their relatively non-interacting dark matter halos with
them). The multiplicity of empirical results provide a variety of constraints on the nature
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of dark matter–whatever it is, it will have to be consistent with each of them.
The Hubble Deep Field
In 1995, Robert Williams allocated some of his Director’s Discretionary Time on the Hubble
Space Telescope to observations of a patch of sky relatively free of foreground objects but
otherwise thought to be typical. That is, rather than targeting known astronomical objects,
the strategy was to literally look where nothing in particular had previously been observed.
The researchers did have a broad aim—they were interested generally in the formation and
evolution of galaxies—and they wanted to use Hubble to image these processes in the early
universe. However there was no specific hypothesis driving this observational research.
Rather, they were seeking general results that could be used to constrain theories of galaxy
evolution. The long exposures made of this region revealed images of the young universe,
depicting an astounding array of ancient galaxies which were too faint to have been observed
previously. These early galaxies were found to be more irregular than galaxies are now in
our own neighborhood, supporting the idea that galaxy mergers were more frequent in the
early universe than today. The success of this strategy lead Hubble researchers to perform
several subsequent observations in a similar spirit resulting in the Hubble Deep Field South,
the Hubble Ultra-Deep Field, and the eXtreme Deep Field.
In the case of dark matter, more concrete proposals are available but there are a num-
ber of rather different options on the table that are underdetermined by the evidence so
far. In making observations of different physical systems thought to involve dark matter,
researchers can accumulate desiderata to which the nature of any empirically viable dark
matter candidate must conform, i.e. more phenomena that proposals must save. The impe-
tus for the imaging the Hubble Deep Field was also born out of a relatively open epistemic
context—lots of unanswered questions about the formation and evolution of galaxies over
cosmic history. We might tentatively call the two strategies exemplified here characterizing
a phenomenon and surveying. It would be useful and interesting to explore these strate-
gies and others further, to investigate their variety and applicability across the empirical
sciences–in experimental as well as observational contexts, in the life sciences as well as the
physical sciences.
If a comprehensive enough collection can be articulated, then it may be possible to shift
from the primarily descriptive mode to the normative. That is, it may be possible to rec-
ommend strategies for generating certain types of constraints given a particular epistemic
context. Perhaps philosophy of science could systematize a methodological palette, accom-
panied by conditional recommendations for the application of its various elements. Of course
one might object that scientists do very well on their own without any such suggestions from
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a philosophical peanut gallery. Most of the time this may well be the case. However, as
the recent public debate between scientists around the appropriate methods for scientific
investigation of the early universe show, there can come a point at which having the sort of
sophisticated philosophical resources advocated here would sure come in handy.
We now have the resources to say something helpful about the sticky situation in early
universe cosmology. The epistemic context in inflationary cosmology is much like that in
theorizing about dark energy. As mentioned above, a whole family of models of the potential
of the “inflaton” field can be characterized by just a few parameters, which can then be
constrained by empirical results. This is a way to make progress in constraining theorizing
about inflation without abandoning the unique role for empirical data. Given the existence
of such a strategy, the move to non-empirical confirmation in early universe theorizing looses
its motivation. Even Dawid (2016) admits that when empirical data is available it ought to
trump non-empirical considerations:
eventual empirical testing is always in the background and, once conclusive empirical testing
can be achieved, will in all cases make a stronger case for the theory’s viability than non-
empirical confirmation ever could. (204)
Perhaps one could object that the shift to non-empirical confirmation allows much more or
better progress than that afforded by putting bounds on generic parameters characterizing
possible inflaton potentials. Indeed, constraining the shape of the inflaton potential provides
precious little insight into the nature of inflation (cf. Baytas¸ et al., 2015). A committed
empiricist will obviously deny that more or better progress could be had with the non-
empirical shift. However, I hope to have shown that such a shift would be premature in
cosmology at least—there are still empirical constraints to be had in this field.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS: EPISTEMIC ATTITUDES AND PROGRESS
Appreciating the nature of empirical constraints yields a picture of epistemic progress in
science. I argue that scientists accumulate empirical evidence and that they also gain knowl-
edge that viable theorizing will be consistent with the evidential corpus, suitably interpreted.
In other words, on my view scientific knowledge is not to be understood as knowledge that
any particular theory is true, that any particular model will continue to be fruitful, or even
knowledge that the truth is somewhere in the landscape of viable theoretical approaches even
if it cannot be singled out. Instead, I propose a shift in the target of our usual epistemic
commitment away from theories towards empirical evidence and to the constraints that they
pose on viable scientific proposals.
Anything realistically recognizable as the result of a modern experiment or observation
is mediated by layer upon layer of interpretation. Peeling back these successive layers does
not reveal some immutable core that constitutes the pure experiential foundation of the
result. This does not mean that there is nothing that is distinctively empirical, but it does
mean that whether a result is empirical or not already involves interpretive resources. In
cases where aspects of the epistemic resources to be employed in interpreting results change,
the relevant layers of an existing result will have to be revisited and and my have to be
reinterpreted or reprocessed in order to be put to use. Particularly important among the
interpretive layers are those by dint of which the result is understood to be influenced by
the target of study in nature since being produced via causal interaction with the target is
what differentiates the result as empirical.
The layers I have in mind are associated with significant stages in the actual production
of the result in the course of the experiment or observation, the subsequent data analysis, and
presentation of the final data products. For instance, there are typically various assumptions
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about how the experimental or observational apparatus works, informed cuts and other
processing that are performed on the raw data, as well as choices regarding how the data
should be expressed, depicted, or otherwise packaged. A bare number or a curve printed on a
page is useless as a source of empirical content without rich interpretive resources introduced
at these stages. Even data records themselves are expressed within particular interpretive
frameworks. In unfortunate situations, scientists hoping to re-appraise some data record may
not have access to the background information that they would need in order to reinterpret
it.
Nevertheless, empirical evidence is durable in the sense that there is an onus on any
viable framework to furnish a way of understanding the evidence in a consistent manner.
Enriched evidence accumulates over time and is relevant across multiple successive and co-
contemporaneous contexts. The accumulating evidential corpus provides continuity between
researchers such that even old evidence bears on contemporary models. As the corpus
grows, the interpreting scientists have to carefully wend their way through an ever-thickening
labyrinth of evidence.
Can the view presented above prove fruitful for characterizing a non-internalist account
of scientific progress? In this final chapter, I present the outline of such an account, which
crucially involves accumulation of empirical evidence.
Scientific theorizing on a topic consists in a landscape of (usually multiple) currently
viable theoretical approaches, or interpretive frameworks, for understanding their subject
matter. Often, various details of the viable alternatives will be incompatible with one another
while at the same time being consistent with presently available evidence. The boundaries of
this landscape at any given time are constrained by the body of empirical evidence that has
been accumulated. Progress is driven by the influx of empirical constraints, which change
the boundaries of the landscape over time. As new constraints are uncovered, interpretive
approaches are rejected, modified and added in light of the growing body of evidence.
I want to be clear that I am not claiming that the accumulation of empirical evidence
alone accounts for much of the scientific progress that has been made. Constraining particular
models or families of models requires that those models actually be developed, which is the
activity of theorists and modelers. However, I do think that amassing evidence does play
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a particularly important role in scientific progress. Unchecked by empirical constraints,
scientists can continue to expand the space of viable theoretical alternatives in a given field.
However, without adding further input from nature, they would have no assurance that such
advancements would bring them increasing knowledge about what the world is actually like.
In contrast, exploratory empirical research does generate knowledge about what the world
is like insofar as such research yields new empirical evidence.
It is useful to distinguish between evolving theoretical landscapes and individual mod-
eling lineages. Within a landscape of viable theoretical alternatives, particular scientists or
research groups often work on one approach in particular. Guided by a particular approach,
scientists develop models with the aim of representing and understanding their subject mat-
ter. The constraining influence of empirical evidence on the level of individual proposals can
be traced by appreciating the alterations made to viable models over time. These modeling
lineages—successions of models developed according to a particular approach and altered
in response to new empirical evidence—can be thought of as particular trajectories through
the theoretical landscape.
In a diverse epistemic environment, when there are multiple viable modeling approaches,
scientists attempt to constrict the landscape by extracting distinguishing features from the
competing alternatives, collecting differential empirical evidence and evaluating model fea-
tures in light of that evidence. In cases where particular models have not been developed,
scientists try to construct models that are consistent with known empirical evidence and that
could be used to generate further testable inferences. In contrast, exploratory observational
research such as the Hubble Deep Field, does not require motivation from any particular
modeling or theorizing trajectory, although novel evidence collected via that research could
certainly inspire new proposals. Empirical constraints on models add up to empirical con-
straints on the broader landscape (see Morgan and Morrison, 1999).
Philosophers of science have extensively considered the underdetermination of theories
by evidence. However, typically philosophical discussions of underdetermination have been
guided by—and perceived of as having consequences for—worries about which particular
scientific theories (if any) we should believe to be true. Underdetermination is perceived as a
problem standing in the way of picking out the one true theory from a crowd of empirically
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equivalent doppelgangers. This focus has obscured the fact that the existence of multiple
viable theoretical alternatives at any given point in time is absolutely germane to scientific
practice.
Scientists typically adopt a particular theoretical approach from among the viable alter-
natives, which they see as promising. Students being trained in a research group will often be
schooled in the favorite approach of the group, which has significant effects on the particular
types of research activities with which they engage. However, I think that it is important to
distinguish this kind of tentative adoption of frameworks from belief in a particular theory.
The epistemic attitudes that scientists have towards their working theoretical approaches are
less committal and more subtle than belief. These attitudes leave room for the reassessment
of alternatives by stepping back to re-engage with the larger landscape of viable alternatives.
Moreover, the tentative epistemic attitudes leave room for the modification of the working
framework in light of new evidence.
Let us consider the epistemic attitudes appropriate to models, modeling lineages, and
whole theoretical landscapes. Scientists are not particularly epistemically attached to in-
dividual models—and for good reason. Individual models are often altered in response
to empirical constraints, sometimes forming long-term modeling lineages, sometimes being
abandoned altogether. Models are adopted tentatively, and modeling lineages are pursued
(or at least kept alive in the background) until empirical constraints are so severe as to render
them untenable. That is to say, the epistemic attitude appropriate to particular theoretical
approaches (the MACHO dark matter hypothesis say) is something short of belief.
It seems to me that the epistemic attitude appropriate to live theoretical options is
captured by regarding those options as empirically viable. This attitude is perhaps best
described as tolerance. It would be a mistake to wed ourselves to one of our current theories.
We have every reason to believe that we have not exhaustively collected all of the empirical
evidence that the world has to offer and it may turn out that such evidence will constrain our
present theories in unanticipated ways. Indeed, if we were to abandon the kind of epistemic
caution that I am advocating and endorse our current best theories, it would be difficult to
make any sense of the motivation for cases in which research aims to build up new theoretical
resources and to put them in contact with new empirical constraints in order to learn about
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some part of nature that is not yet well understood.
Of course the non-epistemic attitudes that scientists have towards theories can be quite
diverse and very preferential. For instance, a scientist may favor a particular approach due
to its novelty, elegance, facility, familiarity, etc. Indeed, some scientists have such strong
preferences for particular approaches that they spend their entire careers developing and
defending them. However, these factors are irrelevant to epistemic commitment. Whether
an approach should be tolerated or not is determined by it compatibility with the available
evidential corpus.
Do (or should) scientists somehow place their belief in the entire landscape instead?
I do not think so. Scientists certainly do not believe all of the various approaches in a
landscape simultaneously. The landscape is the repository of approaches which are still
deemed appropriate for further work. Rather, what comes to be known is the evidence—the
dynamic boundary molding and delimiting viable interpretations, which has been gathered
from observations and experiments. Beyond the mere accumulation of empirical evidence,
scientists also come to know that any realistic understanding of the part of the world being
investigated will have to be consistent with that evidence. Thus, rather than coming to know
specific theories, scientists come to know the outlines of possible theories. Nevertheless, in
filling in the outlines, scientists continually learn about what the natural world is really like.
Objection: empiricism is unproductive One might worry that adopting the rel-
atively conservative epistemic attitude of tolerance towards our most successful scientific
theories is misguided since taking those theories seriously is a productive way to encourage
theoretical development. My response to this objection is that taking the content of our best
theories seriously as a heuristic for developing new theories is perfectly compatible with my
view. In particular, my view is very liberal with respect to the reasons particular scientists
(or scientific communities) have for pursuing and developing one theory over another. Con-
sider dark matter research. A particular group (ADMX) takes the proposal that that the
theoretical particle the axion could be galactic dark matter so seriously that they built an
apparatus to try to detect such axions interacting with photons of the field generated by a
10T superconducting solenoid. The energy ranges they look at, and the required sensitivity
of the experiment is determined by what they would expect to observe if the galactic dark
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matter were axions. Results of this experiment will be significant for the development of
particle physics and theories of dark matter, insofar as they will provide new empirical con-
straints. I could readily tell a similar story about gravity experiments, neutrino experiments,
etc. These research programs are predicated on taking the theoretical proposals seriously as
viable options. Similarly, the conceptual elaboration of these proposals, and the development
of their attending models is also predicated on taking them seriously as viable candidates.
However, “taking the proposals seriously” for the purpose of developing them and testing
them, need not (and indeed should not) amount to believing them to be true. One can
perfectly well pursue a theory without endorsing it with your epistemic commitment.
To summarize: progress consists in the accumulation of empirical evidence, but this
evidence does not have a single fixed interpretation. Furthermore, the accumulation of
evidence in this sense furnishes knowledge about what the natural world is like in the sense
that any viable theory of the natural world will have to accommodate the evidential corpus.
This view is not a variety of instrumentalism or of foundationalist empiricism. In par-
ticular, my view is different from an instrumentalist who thinks that scientific theories only
aim to match predictions and empirical results—by whatever means. For such an instru-
mentalist, a parameterized model whose components have no suspected physical correlates
would be just as acceptable as a model whose components are taken to represent objects and
processes in nature. I think this view is both descriptively inadequate with respect to scien-
tific practice and ill-advised as a method for learning about nature. In contrast, scientists
in fact try to propose physically plausible theories, they aim at representational fidelity.
I think that one could reasonably be an instrumentalist in the following sense: certain
“patches” are introduced in the course of science with the aim of expediently generating
predictions, which scientists know full well are not intended to be representationally faithful.
However, it is important that these patches be carefully documented and kept track of, so
as not to be mistaken for physically plausible representations. Similarly, I think that there
are perfectly good uses of instrumental models in many domains of science (especially the
applied sciences) such as for making weather predictions. However, in the context of basic
science research, theories are intended as candidate representations.
Furthermore, my account of empirical evidence is far more permissive than that associ-
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ated with traditional empiricists. In particular, my view is different from that of an empiri-
cist who thinks that we can only have knowledge about that which we can observe with our
unaided senses. It is clear that empirical constraints are interpreted using the conceptual
resources of theory. However I want to stress that this fact does not prevent the accumu-
lation of empirical evidence across theory change. Indeed, as I have already said, when
scientists have access to information about the methods by which empirical constraints were
generated, they can often repurpose old results in the context of new theoretical resources.
It may be useful to contrast the present view with those espoused by Larry Laudan and
Bas van Fraassen. Laudan (1977) discusses different types of epistemic commitment that
researchers can have to their models, identifying what he calls the context of acceptance and
the context of pursuit (108-109). He suggests that scientists should accept theories (treat
them as if they were true) if they have the highest problem-solving adequacy. For Laudan,
progress in science is made by choosing theories or research traditions that are better solvers
of empirical and conceptual problems. He also suggests that scientists may rationally choose
to pursue a theory that they would not accept, if the theory has a higher rate of increasing
problem-solving adequacy than its competitors.
My methodological bar is somewhat lower than Laudan’s in that on my account, scientists
may rationally choose to work on a theoretical approach that is viable given the current
evidential corpus—or even that they suspect can be developed to become viable via physically
plausible modifications. In addition, on my view progress in science does not consist in
moving from acceptance of one theory to acceptance of another theory that solves more
empirical and conceptual problems. Rather than understanding progress in terms of the
particular (viable) frameworks that scientists choose to work within, I suggest that progress
is better understood in terms of the accumulation of empirical evidence. My view is not
internalist in the manner that Laudan’s view is, because I think that the growing stockpile
of empirical constraints is relevant to scientists working in different research traditions. Even
if a particular observation solves a local empirical problem for a scientist working within a
particular research tradition, that is not the full extent of its epistemic import. The epistemic
impact of the evidence lingers long after individual research traditions are buried.
My view shares more ground with van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. Like van
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Fraassen, I do not think that scientists are ever in a position to believe a particular theory
as “the one true theory”. Rather, at any given time, scientists have a repository of theoret-
ical resources that they judge to be viable relative to the available evidential corpus. The
appropriate epistemic attitude towards such viable theories is not belief.
However, my view differs from van Fraassen’s in two important respects. First, my
account of empirical accessibility is much more permissive than his. van Fraassen was wrong
to cash out empirical access in terms of what is observable via the unaided human senses.
According to van Fraassen (1980), “X is observable if there are circumstances which are such
that, if X is present to us under those circumstances, then we observe it” (16). Much of
the subject matter of modern science is not observable in this sense (see Churchland and
Hooker, 1985; Hacking, 1985; Teller, 2001). However, an empiricist need not maintain that
the only knowledge that can be gained is about objects and events that are observed by
unaided human senses. We have an understanding of empirical access that encompasses
sophisticated detection methods and instruments such as bolometers and gravitational wave
interferometers. I think that we can learn about (for example) what happens at the center
of the sun, where presumably van Frassen’s definition of “observable” fails. Scientists have
gathered empirical evidence (e.g. from solar neutrinos) that constrains viable theorizing
about the center of the sun and the processes and substances therein.
Second, on my view the commitment that scientists have to the landscape of viable
theoretical approaches is not as strong as van Fraassen’s. For van Fraassen, scientists accept
theories they believe to be empirically adequate, i.e. theories that they believe are consistent
with currently available evidence and will continue to be adequate to all future evidence
(ibid., 12). This notion of acceptance is so strong that I doubt that very many scientists hold
this sort of attitude towards even their most favorite theories. In contrast, when scientists
do manage to construct long-lasting theories, I think we should expect that they are likely
to engage in exploratory research to see if a research front can be re-ignited. On my view,
scientists are committed to the durability of the empirical evidence accumulated so far, even
if the interpretation of that evidence will have to be modified in the future.
My approach also shares some similarity with Popper’s falsificationism, in the sense that
the landscape of viable theories is pruned by empirical evidence and agreement of some the-
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ory with the evidential corpus does not warrant belief that it is true. One important sense in
which my view differs from Popper’s however, is that I do not think that scientific methodol-
ogy properly consists in bold conjectures handed from theorists to experimentalists bent to
try to falsify them. Indeed, there are episodes that contribute to scientific progress in which
surprising empirical evidence has motivated new theoretical approaches (e.g. supernovae
observations motivating theorizing about the accelerating expansion of the universe). In
fact, some exploratory research can be characterized as open-ended investigation employed
for the purpose of generating new empirical constraints on viable theorizing.
In this dissertation I have laid the groundwork for an empiricist epistemology of science
that is applicable to science in practice. I have articulated the core commitments of em-
piricism in philosophy of science, presented an argument for what makes data distinctively
empirical, introduced an account of empirical evidence that embraces theory-ladenness, and
I have explored how this account of evidence affects what it means to adjudicate empirical
adequacy and what resources are required for this task. In addition, I have begun to address
the nature and variety of empirical constraints on theorizing, discussing a type of exploratory
research that is importantly dissimilar to hypothesis testing, in which empirical constraints
are generated in a context where available theoretical resources yield little insight into the
specific nature of the worldly target of interest. That is, I have discussed a manner in which
theorizing can be constrained by empirical evidence when the theory to be constrained is
very much under development. Taken together, these arguments trace out a story about
the epistemology of science that flows from the natural world, through empirical data and
its processing, to arrive at the use and reuse of data products for generating constraints on
theorizing.
There are two senses in which this work is about scientific progress at the boundaries
of experience. First, I hope to have shown how scientific progress happens by adding new
evidence to the evidential corpus—that is, how progress happens by enlarging the boundaries
of “experience” via increasing epistemic access to nature. Second, in developing the compo-
nents of this empiricist philosophy of science, I have hoped to crystallize the resources that
an empiricist needs to say how science functions well in the far reaches of our experience.
How is it that human inquirers make genuine epistemic progress in learning about parts of
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the cosmos distant in space and time? My answer to this question resists the temptation
of a drastic epistemic shift in scientific methodology that purports to take scientific inquiry
beyond the boundaries of experience by utilizing non-empirical virtues like parsimony and
explanatory power to guide theory choice once empirical access runs dry. Instead, my stance
is that we make genuine epistemic progress at the boundaries of experience in the ordi-
nary way: by adding to the evidential corpus. This progress happens at the boundaries of
experience to be sure, but not beyond them.
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APPENDIX
ENRICHED EVIDENCE FROM THE HULSE-TAYLOR PULSAR
In this appendix I will illustrate my account of enriched lines of evidence with a concrete
example. This example exhibits the different components of enriched lines of evidence and
highlights why the presuppositions incorporated throughout data collection and processing
determine the epistemic utility of the empirical results thereby generated. The generic struc-
ture to be made concrete is depicted in Figure 8. Data collection generates data records,
which are transformed by data processing into (often a series of) processed data/data prod-
ucts, and finally to an empirical constraint tailored to some particular theoretical context.
We can refer to the data records, processed data, and empirical constraints all as “empirical
results”.
To achieve their celebrated confirmation of general relativity, Taylor and Weisberg (1982)
had to introduce an extensive series of data processing and analysis stages in order to trans-
form the receiver signal from the Arecibo telescope into a estimate of the parameter value of
interest (in this case P˙b the orbital rate of decay of the astronomical object PSR 1913+16)
and then to the claim that gravitational radiation exists. Without belaboring the point, it
is worthwhile to examine this case in slightly more detail since it displays two widespread
(although not universal) features of data processing well: 1) the intricate confluence of pre-
suppositions (both empirical and theoretical) required to produce a final result and 2) the
necessity of invoking the theory to be tested in the course of data processing.1
Note that the empirical value of P˙b that Taylor and Weisberg (1982) compare to the
1cf. Glymour (1975)
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Figure 8: Elements of an enriched line of evidence
theoretical value is the result of a calculation that presupposes the general theory of relativity.
In particular, the model of the stellar system to which the empirical pulse arrival times
are fit is built on the assumption that general relativity is the “correct” theory of gravity
(Taylor and Weisberg, 1982, 911). Yet Taylor and Weisberg were interested in using the
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Hulse-Taylor pulsar results to constrain theories of gravitation besides general relativity
including those of Brans-Dicke, Rosen, Ni, and Lightman-Lee [916, 917]. Parameterized
versions of these alternate theories were used to generate predictions regarding the value of
P˙b. However, Taylor and Weisberg did not calculate the masses of the binary pulsar system
(which are requisite intermediary results on the way to the final estimate for the orbital
decay rate parameter) assuming each different theory independently, but rather just used
those calculated assuming GR. One might well wonder: is this epistemically admissible? Is it
reasonable to assume GR for the purposes of testing theoretical competitors in this context?
If assuming GR is not epistemically admissible, then the pedantic work of calculating
the masses of the binary system objects actually needs to be carried out for each alternative
theory. In fact, since the Blandford-Teukolsky-Epstein model of the pulsar system assumes
GR, and since relativistic corrections are employed in transforming the pulse times to the
pulsar frame, one would have to start all the way back at the pulse times as recorded in the
receiver frame and re-analyze these using the infrastructure of each theory under considera-
tion. Whether or not such reanalysis is possible in practice will depend on the availability
of the original data records–which could amount to a significant logistical problem.
Taylor and Weisberg (1982) provide enough information in their publication for us to
be able to outline their data processing workflow beginning with the data records of pulses
received by the radio telescope (cf. Taylor and Weisberg, 1982, 911). The pulses picked up by
the radio telescope were so weak that in order to obtain a high enough signal-to-noise ratio,
for some datasets the effect of dispersion (due to the interaction of signal with free electrons
on its long journey from the pulsar to the telescope) was compensated for in hardware and
about 5000 pulses averaged together in a block, all before the data are ever recorded Taylor
and Weisberg (1982, 908-909). The recorded arrival times of the (averaged) pulses from ten
different data sets from 1974-1981 were transformed from the receiver frame of reference to
that of the solar system barycenter using planetary positions estimated from eighth-order
interpolation of Lincoln Laboratory ephemeris. These times were then transformed to the
pulsar frame, including second-order relativistic terms and gravitational propagation delay
due to the presence of the companion star using estimates made in earlier research. The
transformed pulse arrival times were used to calculate values for the pulse phase φ. A
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particular relativistic model of the pulsar system, the Blandford-Teukolsky-Epstein model
(which assumes that the pulsar is an intrinsically accurate clock and that the two stars can be
modeled dynamically as point masses), was fit to seven of the data sets using the least squares
method with the residuals calculated for the pulse phase. In light of that fit a set of values for
the model parameters were estimated, including P˙b, the rate of change of the orbital period
of the pulsar. Using a subset of the parameters, values for the masses of the astronomical
objects were computed. These masses, together with some of the other parameter values,
were used to calculate the expected (theoretical) value, (−2.403±0.005)×10−12, of P˙b via the
general relativistic quadrupole formula. This value was then compared to what the authors
call the the “measured” (i.e. estimated empirical) value for P˙b: (−2.30± 0.22)× 10−12. As
one can see, the empirical value includes the expected value within its error bars.
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